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  To what extent have the policies implemented by the Mexican government since 
2006 against the War on Drugs further fueled social violence? What have been the effects 
of violence on security, citizenship well-being, displacement, and human rights? This 
thesis examines how the pervasive violence in Mexico, despite being overwhelmingly 
visible recently, has been embedded into the system since long before. Mexico 
experiences different approaches to violence: ordinary, structural, and drug violence. The 
research question and my contribution are illustrated from four different perspectives, 
based on the various types of violence that exist in the country: intercartel, government-
cartel, cartel-citizens, and government-citizens. After conducting a case study analysis of 
specific events throughout the last three presidential administrations, a recurring pattern 
shows that despite the differences in political background, violence continues to be 
aggravated through a similitude in strategy. Government officials should take meaningful 
action to address the security needs of citizens – despite the presence of violence – and 













 Growing up in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, I remember living a regular childhood 
not plagued by violence. However, in 2010, when I was ten years old, I remember the 
city becoming more dangerous – my parents becoming increasingly attentive to the 
national and local news, getting picked up early from school due to city threats, and 
going to get-togethers that ended up with us laying on the floor after hearing gunshots. 
My childhood, then, consisted of listening about arrests of individuals and national safety 
concerns, as well as, having family friends suffering from the increasing violence. This 
shaped me into a mature woman early on and influenced my outlook on life. The 
following year, moving to the U.S.-Mexico border in Matamoros, Tamaulipas – 
Brownsville, Texas, I noticed how my interest in studying the violence that engulfed 
Mexico’s streets continued to grow. I found myself always engaging in conversations 
with adults and being interested in learning more. This interest has been intellectually 
driven and strengthened as I have pursued my higher education by my professors and 
International Studies courses. I am extremely thankful to my friends and all of those who 
have engaged in conversations with me and have taken the time to listen to me 
passionately speak about it.  
 I am very grateful to my thesis advisor, Dr. Alejandro Olayo-Méndez, SJ for his 
phenomenal contribution and for pushing me to think outside the norm regarding 
Mexico’s situation. Working together created unique opportunities for me to think 
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critically – posing sharp questions, essential advice, and precise recommendations. I am 
appreciative of the possibility of navigating the topic in ways that I had not previously 
considered.  His work and commitment are a source of inspiration as I venture on to 
pursue a professional career. Lastly, I am forever grateful to my family, who has always 
believed in me, pushed me to be a better student, and instilled the values of hard work, 
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As I was completing my study abroad experience in the Fall of 2019 in France, I 
remember opening my bedroom door at my host family's home and feeling an intense 
level of frustration and confusion with what I read on the TV. My host mother was 
watching the breaking news that read “Mexique: la police obligée de libérer un fils d’« El 
Chapo » après avoir été attaquée à l’arme lourde.”1 How was it possible that the Mexican 
National Guard was “forced” to liberate an internationally persecuted criminal? Of all 
places, France was where I found myself feeling a call back to my home country of 
Mexico. This unthinkable action forced by the pressure of the cartels and completed by 
the government encouraged me to pursue the venture of writing this thesis to understand 
on a deeper level the path that Mexico has followed and what has happened to the 
country that decisions such as these are being taken. As a Mexican citizen, I feel the need 
to bring some answers to the concerns about the realities in the country and possibly offer 
a sense of hope to future generations.  
 On October 17, 2019, intense fighting erupted in Culiacán, Sinaloa, a city better 
known as the home to the Sinaloa Cartel, where masked gunmen were throwing up 
burning blockades and trading gunfire with security forces. On this day, labeled as the 
Battle of Culiacán, a patrol by the National Guard went into a house to arrest Ovidio 
Guzmán López, a member of the Sinaloa Cartel and son of the former leader of the cartel, 
 
1 Victor Fortunato, “Mexique : la police obligée de libérer un fils d’«El Chapo» après avoir été attaquée à 




Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.2 His arrest was quickly overpowered by cartel gunmen 
filling the city with roadblocks and unleashing heavy automatic gunfire against military 
personnel and taking the lives of many citizens in the process. Individuals around the area 
were running in an attempt to find shelter — hiding behind car wheels with hands to their 
ears and their eyes flinched, squeezing their bodies underneath cars, and trying to get 
away from the loud, non-stop sound of gunshots.3  
Finding themselves trapped against a power with no intention of holding back, 
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s government, with his approval, decided to 
immediately retreat from the house, without Guzmán, to prevent any further violence in 
the city and preserve the lives of the few-standing military personnel.4 A following 
astounding silence, signifying the backing off of the cartel, could be heard when 
organized crime protected its leader and won its battle against the government of the 
country. What does the Battle of Culiacán represent about the future of Mexico? A 
significant breaking and turning point to the way the government presents itself to the 
eyes of organized crime.   
     In the context of this thesis, my argument of a breaking point is a 
representation of a moment in which the country’s government legitimacy and the hope 
of the citizens reaches a difficult point to reverse – the decision taken by the government 
permitted the battle to be lost and shook the perspectives of citizens. Is letting go of a 
 
2 Philip Luke Johnson, “Revisiting the Battle of Culiacán,” NACLA, November 22, 2019, 
https://nacla.org/news/2019/11/22/culiacan-chapo-mexico-drug-violence. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Jo Tuckman, “El Chapo: Mexican Police Capture Then Release Drug Boss’s Son after Battle with 




criminal the best way to achieve peace? It demonstrates a point when there is a change in 
strategy and approach to protecting the lives of citizens. Despite Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador’s government desire to conduct operations to arrest criminals who endanger the 
livelihood of citizens, his other similar desire to change strategy led his government to 
pursue a different route to achieve peace. The Battle of Culiacán is a story of fear, 
rampage, disorder, and savagery where an illegitimate force ruled. During this day, 
citizens all over the country watched the news with feelings of despair, impotence, and 
disappointment, just like I did from across the continent. With the retreat of the 
government, it was clear that there is an uneven battle that the country is striving to 
combat, and that has continuously failed to stand up to its policies and plans.  
  Since the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first century, 
Mexico has been devastated by critical levels of visible violence, scoring high in the 
ranks of violent attacks, homicides, and state insecurity.5 Despite the existence of 
multiple perspectives, most commonly, the heightened presence of violence is mostly 
pinpointed to the launch of the War on Drugs against drug-trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) by President Felipe Calderón, indicating a radical change to the mainstream 
political and security approach of Mexico.6 In the analysis of many scholars and evidence 
from the living reality of many citizens, the launching of the war has had a main hand in 
 
5 Laura Calderón, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 
REPORT,” no. Data and Analysis Through 2017, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/40919564/Drug_Violence_in_Mexico_SPECIAL_REPORT. 
6 Angelica Duran-Martinez, The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia 
and Mexico (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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the destabilization of the country politically, economically, and socially.7 
  How did Mexico reach a critical point? The War on Drugs entailed opening the 
country to extensive military presence in many communities, reduce the involvement and 
activity of local and state police forces to their common duties, and attempted to dispatch 
operations to forcibly find any individuals involved in organized crime, particularly 
targeting the main leaders. Known as the “kingpin approach,” this measure intended to 
crack drug cartels by consistently targeting major organized crime figures to disrupt the 
trafficking networks.8 The strategy of destabilizing criminal organizations from top-
bottom brought intense inter-cartel competition, intra-cartel competition, and a 
fragmentation of the organizations, resulting in more violence in the country. Inter-cartel 
competition refers to a fight for territory and/or control within the same region between 
two different DTOs. Intra-cartel refers to a division within the same DTO where 
members fight for hierarchical and command reasons. As a result, the inter-cartel 
competition was present in regions where there was a fight for routes and the market, 
while intra-cartel competition rose because of the destabilization of the ruling structure 
when the head of an organization was arrested or murdered, causing members of the 
organization to want to fill those spots.  
The efforts to fight organized crime have actively overshadowed the history of 
Mexico with violence and drug-trafficking organizations remarkably since the last two 
 
7 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
in Mexico,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 4, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963836. 
8 Laura Calderon, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 




decades of the twentieth century. The recent rise of violence has extensively affected 
opportunities for societal growth9, has hindered the legitimacy of governmental 
institutions, and has exacerbated the lost hope of citizens10. Scholar Beatriz Magaloni 
claims that citizens in Mexico are trapped between two illegitimate forces — the drug 
gangs and their criminal organizations and the police who are supposed to protect them.11     
Magaloni’s conclusion is one many scholars and researchers agree with, nonetheless, it 
can additionally encompass other aspects in which Mexican citizens are trapped: the 
consistent failure of institutions, overarching fear, and deep history of embedded 
violence.12  
In an effort to provide Mexican citizens prosperity and welfare, after being overall 
at unceasing risk, it is crucial that as a researcher I attempt to link patterns and make 
connections on how the decisions and strategies made by the government have affected 
citizens. As a result of these broken strategies, it will be evaluated how violence has 
become intertwined with political leadership, community development, and impacted 
societal well-being. I will interpret previous events and decisions to understand what has 
happened in Mexico’s past that led to a critical event such as the one on October 17th, 
2019 to happen – an event where a government had to decide to give control to organized 
crime to prevent further deaths, violence, and exposure. I am interested in showcasing the 
 
9 Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear.” 
10 Luisa R. Blanco, “The Impact of Crime on Trust in Institutions in Mexico,” European Journal of 
Political Economy 32 (December 1, 2013): 38–55, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.06.004. 
11 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
in Mexico,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 4, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963836. 
12 Elena Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre,” Desacatos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 
0, no. 40 (December 16, 2013): 13–32, https://doi.org/10.29340/40.253. 
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intensity and the impact of this altercation since it is relatively recent, and how it 
represents what I consider to be the breaking point in the whole path that the country has 
experienced with organized crime and how it could take a toll in the future. There have 
been events in Mexico that have fueled violence caused by the arms trade and inter-cartel 
war, but this was significantly different. It was a statement. In this specific event, we see 
the livelihood of many Mexican citizens truly at risk and the government choosing to take 
a step back because of fear. This was the epitome of lost hope for most Mexican citizens. 
By the end of this thesis, I want to propose a way of foreshadowing what might be the 
possible considerations to ensure the safety of citizens despite the growing presence of 
organized crime. 
 As a result, this paper seeks to deep dive into the current realities of the country, 
based on the understanding of its history with violence, to provide information and 
recommendations that could become agents for a process of reconstruction of hope for 
Mexican citizens. Some of these realities include the failure of the government to offer 
safe avenues for citizens, the presence of organized crime in all aspects of daily life, the 
fear with which citizens live, and how decisions taken by the government can indirectly 
disproportionately affect citizenship well-being. Additionally, I want to provide citizens 
and interested scholars with a comprehensive study and explanation of certain aspects of 
the history of Mexico to provide more information regarding some of the roots and 
challenges that Mexico has experienced – adding to the debates existing today.  
  The thesis will be divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I outline the 
research questions and design of the thesis, the methods of how I will analyze and 
 7 
 
compare cases, and provide key information about my interest. Chapter 2 will provide 
background information on the generalized violence that exists in Mexico, the common 
debates of this war by scholars when trying to interpret the peak of violence that Mexico 
has experienced, and the often-unspoken reality of the transition from structural violence 
to visible, brutal drug violence. Chapter 3 will encompass the scholarly review to provide 
an analysis of the previous studies conducted by scholars to disentangle the heightened 
violence.  Chapter 4 will provide the key main arguments to answer the question: to what 
extent have the policies implemented by the Mexican government since the War on 
Drugs further fueled social violence? This will be followed by a case study analysis of 
the main arguments based on specific events throughout the last three presidential 
administrations. My contribution will have a four-way approach to understand the current 
presence of violence and how it has affected citizens from a variety of lenses. Chapter 5 
will present a clearer conclusion of the impact that the violence that exists in Mexico has 
on its citizens and the fear that they endure daily. Then, I will mention key aspects that 
result from the Mexico-United States bilateral relationship. The United States’ hidden 
market plays a critical role in engaging in a vicious cycle with Mexico’s supply of drugs 
and interest for high-caliber weapons. 13 The existing need to exchange guns and drugs 
results in major violence for citizens, violation of human rights, and the ability for 
organized crime to have more equipment and power than Mexico’s military.14 The thesis 
 
13 Chelsea Parsons and Eugenio Weigend Vargas, “Beyond Our Borders,” Center for American Progress, 
accessed September 25, 2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-
crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/. 
14 Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar García-Ponce, “Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and 




will conclude by offering ways to slowly restructure the system in a more favorable way 

























1.1    RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Mexico, most prominently the last two decades, has suffered from an increased 
presence of organized crime in the streets impacting civilians directly — through 
altercations on their way to work, a fear of becoming a victim, and a concern for the 
security of their families and businesses daily. This reality has often been reflected as an 
active agent causing a demise in the number of opportunities available for citizens to 
develop, shining a light on the failing leadership and governance, and portraying a 
country overwhelmed by criminal activity. Mexico’s economic, political and social 
development is at continuous risk.1 The plan for this thesis is to analyze the path 
dependency pattern that has been clear by the decisions taken by the three presidential 
administrations since the War on Drugs against organized crime began with President 
Felipe Calderón.2  
Social scientists generally mention the notion of path dependence to support a 
variety of claims — such as that “specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; large 
consequences may result from relatively small events; particular courses of action, once 
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and political development is often 
 
1 Chelsea Parsons and Eugenio Weigend Vargas, “Beyond Our Borders,” Center for American Progress, 
accessed September 25, 2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-
crime/reports/2018/02/02/445659/beyond-our-borders/. 
2 Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. Print. 
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punctuated by critical moments that shape the basic contours of life.”3 Throughout the 
thesis, I will focus on Jacob Hacker’s argument that “path dependence refers to 
developmental trajectories that are inherently difficult to reverse” with the study 
conducted by Paul Pierson in his book Politics in Time (2004).4 I will analyze more 
extensively the reality that despite efforts being implemented by the governmental 
institutions and leadership, there has been a lack of effectiveness because the approaches 
have in some ways incentivized and led to more violence. Most importantly, in the 
Mexican case, it is key to see how the government has changed between three political 
parties in the last fifteen years and how the results of the fight against organized crime 
display similitude in approach and outcome. 
Pierson formulates an argument of the concept of path dependence defined as 
“social processes that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of 
historical development.”5 He claims how each step along a particular path can create 
consequences that increase the “attractiveness” of that path to the situations that follow, 
resulting in effects that generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity.6 
Consequently, two main positive feedback dynamics exist that are central to the concept 
of path dependence. First, they reveal how “the costs of switching from one alternative to 
another will,” in certain contexts, increase over time. Second, they draw attention to the 
 
3 Paul Pierson, “POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PATH DEPENDENCE,” in Politics in Time, History, 
Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004), 17–53, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sgkg.6. 
4 Pierson., pg. 21  
5 Ibid.  
6 Paul Pierson, “POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PATH DEPENDENCE,” in Politics in Time, History, 




issues of “timing and sequence,” distinguishing formative moments that reinforce 
divergent paths.7 The relevance to politics and decision-making arises in situations such 
as the possibilities for employing political authority, the ambiguity of many political 
processes and outcomes, and with change-resistant institutions which are prone to 
positive feedback.  
The central question in research is “To what extent have the policies implemented 
by the Mexican government since 2006 against the War on Drugs further fueled social 
violence?” The independent variables are the policies created and enacted by the 
government to provide a positive change in the country. The dependent variables are the 
implications and consequences for citizens: sociological, emotional, and physical leading 
to exacerbated violence. For this analysis, policies are defined as the legal approaches 
that governments have decided should alleviate the issue, in this case, violence, that 
permeates their society.8 Specifically, to the case that will be studied, the question 
focuses on how has violence in Mexico changed since President Felipe Calderón’s War 
on Drugs in 2006 up to the new government under Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s 
Peace Plan. Focusing from 2006 on will provide insight on the influence of how a direct 
tactic towards organized crime through political competition and intercartel fighting 
could affect social responses. Social violence will be defined as that which arises due to a 
lack of equitable opportunities, grand exposure to crime, and a failed responsibility from 
 
7 Pierson. Pg. 19 




government institutions.9 Through a greater appreciation of historical processes in the 
variation of political life, arguments can highlight temporal ordering and its effect on 
future events.10 Using the path dependency theory as a tool for analysis will be helpful in 
this research as it provides an essential building block for exploring the changes in 
political parties.11 
American economist Douglass North defined institutions as “the rules of the game 
in a society,” meaning the human devised constraints that shape human interaction.”12 
With this, it is claimed that institutional development is subject to positive feedback – 
making it the role of path dependence to explain the patterns of institutional emergence, 
persistence, and change – imperative to the social sciences. Politics involves struggles 
over the authority to establish, enforce, and change the rules governing social action. In 
the case of Mexico, analyzing the three different administrations allows to interpret how 
it is often difficult to change the course of action when implementing policy and 
governance. Developing new approaches to institutions usually entails higher costs, 
learning and coordination effects, and the adoption of change by the individuals around 
it. As a result, these new changes increase the “attractiveness” of the existing institutional 
arrangements compared to the possible hypothetical alternatives,13 as we will explore in 
the case of Mexico. For example, Gerard Alexander's (2001) study of democratic 
 
9 Javier Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico,” Cornell University, 2013, 
https://eventos.itam.mx/sites/default/files/eventositammx/eventos/aadjuntos/2014/01/democratizacion_and
_drug_violence_osorio_appendix_1.pdf. 
10 Pierson, “POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PATH DEPENDENCE.” Pg. 20 
11 Ibid. Pg. 22 
12 Ibid. Pg. 27 
13 Ibid. Pg. 35 
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consolidation is based explicitly on a rational choice framework, in which actors are 
voluntarily bound by history because of the “positively perceived trade-off” between 
short-term costs for long-term improvements. In this case, path dependence is perceived 
to be the result of a rational cost-benefit calculation.14 In Mexico, a similar strategy 
against the War on Drugs has been developed and usually performed, despite the 
intention to switch gears. This implies that the cost of reversing generally rises 
dramatically, shining light on the increased violence.   
A secondary question that I will raise, throughout the thesis, after dissecting the 
research question is: What have been the effects of violence on security, citizenship well-
being, displacement, and human rights? Evaluating how the different policies have 
impacted the livelihood of citizens is important to measure their effectiveness. Security in 
this question is defined as the social and economic stability, the psychological safety of 
citizens, and the presence or lack thereof of street violence in the state.15 Citizenship well-
being is characterized by the ability for citizens to feel safe, comfortable, and able to live 
a dignified life.16 Displacement, in this analysis, is defined as the forced moving of 
citizens from their place of origin to find shelter and safer places to live, mostly leaving 
valuable aspects of their lives behind.17 The main definition to keep in mind is human 
 
14 Ian Greener, “The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies,” 2005, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2005.00230.x. 
15 Dr Zulia Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf,” The Resurgence of 
Violent Crime in Tijuana, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/38402161/The_Resurgence_of_Violent_Crime_in_Tijuana_pdf. 
16 Center for Disease Control, “Well-Being Concepts | HRQOL | CDC,” November 5, 2018, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/wellbeing.htm. 
17 World Health Organization, “WHO | Displaced People,” WHO (World Health Organization), accessed 
April 1, 2021, https://www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/displaced_people/en/. 
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rights defined as the inherent rights that individuals possess for the sake of being human, 
deserving of respect, and opportunities to enhance their lives.18 
I am interested in analyzing these questions and attempting to find answers 
because they are associated with understanding the impact of organized crime in Mexico, 
its security, the kinds of violence that are experienced, the consequences that citizens 
have had to endure, and the steps the government has taken to combat crime. The 
research question will be studied from four different perspectives, based on the various 
types of violence I have concluded and believe to exist in the country: intercartel, 
government-cartel19, cartel-citizens, and government-citizens. Inter-cartel violence is that 
which takes place when drug trade organizations partake in conflict and fight for 
territory, power, and control.20 Government-cartel violence is a result of the altercations 
between the government policies and strategies of the military and the defense 
mechanisms brought by organized crime. Cartel-citizens violence can be seen when 
organized crime actively pursues actions that are harmful to citizens as a pursuit of 
further drug-related activity goals or to demonstrate power. Government-citizen violence 
is an aggression that happens between the policies and approaches taken by the 
government, often overlooked as irrational, but connected to the failed desire and effort 
to provide safety and stability to the citizens.  
 
18 United Nations, “Human Rights | United Nations,” accessed April 1, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/global-
issues/human-rights. 
19 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
20 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
in Mexico,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 4, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963836. 
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In my analysis and argument, I will explain more comprehensively the four types 
of violence that can completely measure the different levels of violence experienced by 
citizens. This will be followed by a short overview of how social violence has risen 
because of a spillover of abuse and damage which is showcased between citizen-citizen 
violence – higher desire to engage in criminal activities due to lack of developmental 
opportunities. These four types can be compartmentalized into broader sections of 
violence such as drug-criminal, political-national domestic, and structural violence which 
will also be mentioned during the theoretical section through the diagram, Figure 1, 
labeled as Breakdown of Approaches to Violence in Mexico.  
By relying on experts in the field and the analysis of reports, this thesis will 
contribute to a more nuanced interpretation of the study of Mexico’s rise of violence and 
the limitations that continue to exist. Many aspects of the research continue to be bubbled 
in obscurity because of the limited, transparent reports, the embeddedness of corruption 
in the system and leadership, and the overwhelming fear that exists against speaking of 
the experiences in the country. All of these need to be continuously addressed to find 
possible strategies to provide a safer and worthy future for citizens. In this thesis, my 
approach to discern and understand the soaring violence will consist of an introduction to 
the kinds of violence that exist in the country, while taking a balcony perspective and a 
step away from the most manifested type of violence– drug violence – and mention how 
the government has attempted to create policies to protect citizens and the results of the 




1.2    RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research analysis of the matter will occur in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 2, I introduce a brief historical timeline of the late part of the twentieth century to 
provide background information on the history of security and stability of Mexico before 
the 2006 War on Drugs. This will be followed by a short overview section, Generalized 
Rising Violence in Mexico, with some main statistics of violent encounters, deaths, and 
trends during each administration to provide insight into the violence and insecurity in 
the country.  
Then, I will provide some key information on the presence of organized crime and 
trends of violence in the section labeled as Three Sexenios during the presidency of 
Felipe Calderón and his efforts to fight organized crime, then Enrique Peña Nieto and its 
policies, then Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s new approach to organized crime which 
in expression differs from his two predecessors illustrated in Figure 5 labeled The Three 
Sexenios’ Agenda. This will provide some insight into the context in which different 
intentions were voiced and the approaches that were taken, due to their political 
affiliation, and the level of violence at their present time.  
The research in Chapter 4 will be composed of a comparative case study analysis, 
a within-unit with temporal variation in which I will be analyzing the presidencies of 
Felipe Calderón, Enrique Peña Nieto, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador. A within-unit 
with temporal variation analysis allows the study to compare the various presidencies 
within Mexico throughout time. I will analyze following Pierson’s argument of the path 
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dependency theory21 to dissect the policies and key events of each of the last three 
Mexican administrations, President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), President Enrique Peña 
Nieto (2012-2018), and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-present) and how 
they were possibly connected and, in many ways, with irreversible decisions, each with 
their respective section. Since the three administrations represent three different political 
parties, it will provide insight on the way each government decided to handle the 
repercussions and initiatives from launching the War on Drugs and how the well-being of 
citizens was intended to be protected. Academic literature and other researchers consider 
hypotheses around a diverse range of factors related to the pervasive violence that exists, 
however, this research will be tackled by analyzing the violent events and impacts of 
strategies at different levels. It is important to study the upcoming reality of heightened 
violence by elaborating on the difference between cartel tactics – showing themselves 
through visibility and invisibility. The comparative analysis will be conducted to measure 
the levels of violence, efficacy, and the strategies of each and whether they were 
appropriate. 
Throughout the thesis, researching the cause-and-effect relationship that exists 
between the implementation of new approaches to combat crime that have resulted in 
more crime will be highlighted. The data used will be qualitative, through a thorough 
analysis of policies and specific emblematic events and how they took place, mostly 
primary and secondary data. The methods of data collection rely on observation and 
 
21 Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. Print. 
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analysis of previous scholarly work such as surveys taken by scholars about the impacts 
on citizen development and the sociological implications of heightened violence. The 
operationalization will rely on ordinal variables to serve comparison in terms of the 
extent of the danger of each event. Additionally, quantitative data will be used to explain 
the extent of each event and operationalize the impact of their proceeding. The 
operationalization will rely on continuous, ratio variables to serve comparison purposes 
such as measuring the impact through the number of deaths, crimes because of drugs, 
reports on violence, and forced displacement due to cartel activity or fear of citizenry. 
Such quantitative data will be an analysis of the reported numbers by reporters, data 
analysts, and witnesses. The data comes from a variety of scholarly resources such as the 
Justice in Mexico report by the University of San Diego which has statistics and data for 
each year. Surveys taken by scholars about the presumed impact that citizens feel and 
what the media portrays will also be used.  
This data will provide insight into the policies in place, the trends of increased 
violence, political competition, and implicit relationships. This approach will be helpful 
to have evidence on the role of the different mechanisms in violence. I will be comparing 
the presidencies— their policies and their political agenda—to see any similarities or 
differences and how the impact is displayed in society. How have the approaches and 
results differed? Comparing the policies and specific breakthrough events is necessary to 
measure the influence that the legal approaches could have had on the patterns of 
violence. The research method selected suits the objective of analyzing the impact of the 
policies tackling organized crime top-bottom and with direct strategies. This research 
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design will provide a comprehensive understanding of key main events and strategies to 
inform the reader and, similarly, be compared side to side between administrations. This 
is the most appropriate design to fully encompass main insights and observations 
throughout the first two decades of the twenty-first century while providing a narrative to 
the reader. The comparison will help answer the research question of the extent to which 
violence has exacerbated based on the events that will be described and the role of 
politics.  
Towards the conclusion of the thesis, I will provide some policy 
recommendations to study the realities of Mexico and how to go about the instability that 
citizens endure every day. I want to contribute to the growing literature about the effects 
that DTOs have had on Mexican development, growth, and security at a societal level. I 
expect to continue shining a light on the issue of violence and insecurity. It is important 
to consider the drug-arms trade nexus that exists between the United States and Mexico. 
The equipment and power that drug-trafficking organizations have gained and how it 
differs from that of the Mexican military has been influenced by the expiration of the 
United States’ Federal Assault Weapons Ban in 2004, as it has been linked to the rising 
of high-caliber weapons in Mexico.22  The understanding of the flow of US weapons to 
Mexico is a key component to analyzing the efforts implemented by both the United 
States and Mexico to reach a better agreement on how to fight criminal organizations. I 
will be evaluating the past and current public policies and proposals of the current 
 
22 Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar García-Ponce, “Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and 




administration. Are the policies achieving the desired outcome and how have they 











Despite the overwhelming rise in violence in the last decades, the presence of 
working drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico dates back to the twentieth century. 
Mexico’s prime location in drug trafficking routes and proximity to the largest market, 
the United States, has been the home to criminal organizations that are engaged in illicit 
activities in collaboration with other Latin American countries. Marijuana and opium 
production in the state of Sinaloa began around the nineteenth century. Both products 
were regularly exported to the United States before they were prohibited at the beginning 
of the twentieth century,1 where prohibition brought illicit profits to Mexican drug-trade 
organizations. Mexican producers and smugglers became an important supplier of these 
commodities, adding heroin, with operations extending to the states of Chihuahua, 
Durango, Guerrero, and Michoacán.2  In 1998, about 300,000 farmers in Mexico were 
engaged in drug production and another half million were directly or indirectly related to 
drug smuggling.3 The cartels are fueled by the United States’ demand for drugs – using 
part of their profits to purchase high-powered firearms from states along the border.4 
Criminal organizations have existed since then and succeeded without relying primarily 
 
1 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 
2 David Shirk and Joel Wallman, “Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
59, no. 8 (December 1, 2015): 1348–76, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587049. 
3 Lingling Lu, “An Analyze of Anti-Drug Policy and Its Effects of Enrique Peña Nieto’s Government in 
Mexico | International Relations and Diplomacy - Academia.Edu,” January 2020, 
https://www.academia.edu/42072610/An_Analyze_of_Anti_Drug_Policy_and_Its_Effects_of_Enrique_Pe
%C3%B1a_Nieto_s_Government_in_Mexico?auto=download&email_work_card=download-paper. 
4 Laura Mehalko, “This Is Gun Country: The International Implications of U.S. Gun Control Policy Note,” 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 35, no. 1 (2012): 297–330. 
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on the use of violence to achieve their financial means and interests.5   
Since its start in the 1930s, the hegemonic Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) was actively aware of cartel existence in the country and managed them through 
protection.6 Mexico was involved in an extensive drug trade, significant in size, which 
was incorporated into a larger system of economic and political corruption in a mutual 
relationship with the PRI’s party apparatus. The drug trade was growing stronger due to 
their provision of service as main routes after the diversion of cocaine flow from the 
Caribbean to the overland Mexico route, and as the Colombian drug-trafficking 
organizations were splitting and decreasing in hegemony.7  
The PRI for many years was successful at accomplishing a state of stability 
through a custom of systemic corruption labeled as “state-sponsored protection.” It 
consisted of authorities, from all levels of the government, regularly extracting bribes 
from traffickers. Bribery was mostly strengthened by the state, rather than undermined. 
As a result, the top-down control of bribery was institutionalized. Despite the 
questionable objectives and approach, the PRI was accomplishing “something,” there was 
peace in the eyes of the citizens.8 Criminals were enjoying high-level protection, or at 
least a lack of law enforcement, from what we can surely label corrupt government 
 
5 Javier Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico,” Cornell University, 2013, 
https://eventos.itam.mx/sites/default/files/eventositammx/eventos/aadjuntos/2014/01/democratizacion_and
_drug_violence_osorio_appendix_1.pdf. 
6 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 




authorities.9 This illegal sector, for a long time, was characterized by a long absence of 
overt and sustained hostilities.10 This implicit, but very clear relationship ensured 
cohesion providing the state with the ability to conduct quick enforcement, when 
necessary, to discipline the behavior of traffickers if it went outside the pre-stated 
guidelines. The state protection encouraged criminals to hide any violent behavior in 
exchange for the license to partake in their illicit activities.11 Drug-trafficking 
organizations were alive and thriving. Nonetheless, what this says about the 
governmental institutions in Mexico is something to keep in mind.  
Corruption, a prevalent factor that entails the criminal organizations having the 
economic power to deter the state from using repression against them, was a main 
component of the PRI ruling.12 The corrupt implicit relationships with criminal 
organizations were interrupted by the process of re-democratization of the Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN) towards the end of the twentieth century. While it is important to note 
that this process of democratization did not eliminate corruption, since it is still an 
overwhelmingly part of Mexico’s roots, it meant that bribe-taking was no longer part of 
an institutionalized, hierarchy-reinforcing system. The shift in political parties weakened 
the consent that existed between the government and organized crime, pushing cartels 
towards more violent strategies to achieve their financial goals. Nonetheless, actual 
 
9 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
10 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
11 Angelica Duran-Martinez, The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia 
and Mexico (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
12 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 
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visible anti-state violence and citizen threat remained rare until the last years of President 
Fox and the beginning of Felipe Calderón, from 2004-2008.13 
At the turn of the century, with the increasing political competition in the hands of 
a democratic regime, government authorities were motivated to enforce the law against 
criminal organizations and alter the status quo of protection. As a result, a chain of 
actions and reactions that generated and aggregated the escalation of violence persisted. 
The PAN’s decisive crackdown was sold as a means to achieve three goals in their 
agenda: tackle corruption, reduce violence, and alter the state role. The PAN was 
interested in reducing drug flows and corruption at the cost of short-term violence and 
tackling the struggle to end the corrupting pattern.14 As a response, the collapse of the 
PRI’s protection system became a key trigger towards the beginning of inter-cartel 
violence and, eventually, some instances of government-cartel violence. This collapse 
offers important insights into the foggy linkages between corruption, violence, and the 
state’s capacity to take a prominent role in the suppression or showcasing of aggression.15  
Today, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s new rising leftist political 
party, MORENA, the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, promises to bring a new 
outlook and shape to Mexico.16 President López Obrador has been clear in his perception 
of both the current laws and institutions of the country as instruments of the corrupted 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
15 Ibid.  




establishment power that persists, leaving many doubts about how he plans to provide a 
fair democracy for the marginalized communities.17 His new individualistic governing 
style can disregard the Mexican institutions that, while weak, have still been set up to 
ensure the presence of a rule of law – a rule of law that should be strengthened – to guide 
the country towards the fresh start MORENA believes the Mexican citizenry deserves 
and should have. Nonetheless, the domestic and internal interest of MORENA has 
undermined any international support and guidance persisting in further corruption and 
failing leadership.  
2.1    GENERALIZED RISING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 
Mexico has been displayed and portrayed for the past two decades as a country 
that has experienced uprising violence and often been labeled as a dangerous place. The 
rising violence in Mexico has been tightly intertwined with the uprising of visible drug 
violence caused by the disruption of long-precedent PRI political rule. The gradual shift 
that has occurred over the last several years with the restructuring of the government’s 
efforts against organized crime has led to other strains of violence appearing as a result of 
the instability of the country. A visible wave of violence against women, femicides, has 
also experienced a disturbing spike. Violence, insistently, started coming from all 
directions of the spectrum.18 
Since then, the illicit drug trade took new routes and shifted towards the 
 
17 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Andrés Manuel López Obrador and a New Era of Politics in Mexico,” Brookings 
(blog), July 3, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/03/andres-manuel-lopez-
obrador-and-a-new-era-of-politics-in-mexico/. 
18 Gabriela Calderón et al., “The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in 




proliferation of new forms of organized crime. Citizens were facing more dangerous 
threats as a result of organized crime embedding itself in ordinary daily activities. The 
fragmentation of Mexican criminal organizations shook the previous stability of the 
country opening it to more forms of visible crime in the streets.19 Roughly a third to half 
of all homicides in Mexico bear the signs of organized-crime violence, with the use of 
high-caliber weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages.20 Grievously, 
Mexico has experienced a massive escalation of violence of unprecedented 
characteristics.21 
Drug cartels are motivated to fight for strategic points and territories – 
transportation hubs and international trade logistics such as ports, airstrips, airports, or 
high-speed highways – close to the US border and major cities in Mexico. Being in 
control of main points allows DTOs to smuggle drugs into the large market of the United 
States and gives them the power to tax the long-distance drug trade of other criminal 
organizations.22 While DTOs are primarily about the trafficking of narcotics, they have 
diversified into other illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, oil theft, 
and human trafficking. These criminal organizations have extended to many realms of 
society and built a high capacity for violence.23 The access to massive profits has turned 
DTOs into powerful organizations, allowing them to recruit citizens to serve as assassins, 
 
19 Calderon et al., “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico.” 
20 Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL REPORT.” 
21 Javier Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico,” Cornell University, 2013, 
https://eventos.itam.mx/sites/default/files/eventositammx/eventos/aadjuntos/2014/01/democratizacion_and
_drug_violence_osorio_appendix_1.pdf. 




to buy military arsenals to fight the state, and to buy government officials and law 
enforcement – their main strategies.24  
Scholars have analyzed the standard threshold of defining national conflict as a 
civil war at around 1,000 deaths a year. Lamentably, Mexico faces a death toll caused by 
organized crime similar to that of civil wars. In the eyes of Felipe Calderón, when 
starting his government, the single issue that required his immediate action was 
deploying the armed forces to fighting criminal organizations. His strategy was more 
violent than ever expected, so the country and the world witnessed horrific acts directed 
against criminals and innocent people for at least ten years now.25 
Current pessimism in Mexican society with regards to the War on Drugs has 
harmed the development of a cohesive state. From 2007 to 2010, the fight against DTOs 
killed about 35,000 people. As noted by Osorio, this death toll represents comparability 
to the onset of 35 civil wars in four years only, a disturbing amount. The number of 
deaths since it launched and the feeling of frustration by citizens shows that it will be 
much longer, blooded, and, based on just the Battle of Culiacán, perhaps continued to be 
lost.26 There is fear, as in terms of scale, duration, and impact, since the war is surely the 
country’s most severe conflict since the Mexican revolution.27  
 
24 Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear.” 
25 Carlos Vilalta, “How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly? An Assessment of the Initial Conditions of the 
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Crime, then, has had consequences for both the nation’s economy and its 
institutional stability. The trust in institutions was hindered by the implicit relationships 
of the past and those who are perceived to still exist causing further issues related to 
social capital and development. The resounding waves of insecurity take a significant toll 
on the development and growth of strong and healthy populations. Social capital, 
understood as the density of trust existing within a group and the determination of how 
easily people work together, serves as an engine for economic growth and development, 
however, Mexico has experienced a decline in the effectiveness of it.28 One of the biggest 
concerns that this paper seeks to address is the serious risk that the problems of 
corruption and violence have had on the lives of citizens. The combination of the two 
phenomena has drastically undermined Mexico’s democratic system.29 Citizens’ 
incentives and performance decreased due to the overwhelming amount of presence of 
organized crime as several government officials reinforced their interests first.  
Citizens in Mexico began to encompass a fear that any type of growth or 
prosperity could shine a sign of success that could rapidly be undermined by organized 
crime.30 For example, the rapid increase of assaults and robberies deters many families 
from attempting to start their own business or show any prosperity. In circumstances such 
as these is when the failure of protection from governmental institutions and the harmed 
trust began to weaken the country further. Social capital is associated with better 
 
28 Luisa R. Blanco, “The Impact of Crime on Trust in Institutions in Mexico,” European Journal of 
Political Economy 32 (December 1, 2013): 38–55, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.06.004. 
29 Laura Calderon, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 
REPORT,” no. Data and Analysis Through 2017, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/40919564/Drug_Violence_in_Mexico_SPECIAL_REPORT. 
30 Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear.” 
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governance and greater political accountability – it has a positive effect in countries 
where institutions and the rule of law are weak, in which Mexico could benefit.31  
2.2    COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
 
There are misunderstandings of how this level of insecurity developed in the 
country. The three that will be mentioned throughout the thesis are that violence is and 
has been part of the Mexican system, that the previous invisibility of violence did not 
mean there was a lack of harm, and the critical role that security institutions such as the 
police play in society. Violence is often labeled on the drug trade organizations that, in 
their pursuit of profitability, take the lives of citizens in the process. However, as 
previously stated, their involvement in criminal activities goes back for many decades. It 
is, then, imperative to analyze the embeddedness of violence and how it stems from the 
roots of the country. To find plausible causation of the weakness that the institutions and 
government of Mexico are experiencing, it is argued by some academics that the epitome 
of violence did not surprisingly appear. Violence has, instead, been embedded and 
entrenched in the Mexican system. Mexico had not resolved many of its issues, 
concerning institutional weakness, meaning that they had been hidden successfully under 
the rug by corrupted leadership. Then, despite drug trafficking organizations working 
through invisibility in the past, it can still be argued that the focus of the government was 
not directed towards helping out the citizenry. The interests of all top-down individuals 
involved in the protection racket displayed a blind eye to the development of 
opportunities for the people. The inability to enrich the opportunities of labor for the 
 
31 Blanco, “The Impact of Crime on Trust in Institutions in Mexico.” 
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youth, to establish a rigid social mobility system, the drastic privileges for certain classes, 
and the corruption are many of the things that were already prevalent during the PRI 
hegemony and that had not been resolved when the country was taken aback by 
violence.32  
Drug trade organizations, for many years, worked through invisibility because of 
the implicit relationships with the state. When thinking about this now, a part of the 
violence was also the idea of leaving them hands-off to ensure peace and stability, which 
was accomplished for many years by the PRI rule. When visibility began to arise, this 
was because the state was undergoing changes and organized crime was left hanging.33 In 
the concept of violent democracies, introduced by scholars Desmond Arias and Goldstein 
they argue about the importance of seeing how violence affects political practice and 
subjectivity of individuals in general.34 Understanding that violence has remained an 
instrument for political rule and resistance could bring some sense as to the responses 
provided by the Mexican government. Studying the relationship between democracy and 
violence is important to generate arguments about how Mexico can better fight against 
the growth of crime rates and intensive violent attacks. It can be deducted that by having 
implicit relationships, the government was being violent to its people, but still giving 
some sort of protection from street violence.  
 
32 Marcelo Bergman, “La violencia en México: algunas aproximaciones académicas,” Desacatos, no. 40 
(December 2012): 67–76. 
33 Angelica Duran-Martinez, The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia 
and Mexico (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
34 Daniel M. Goldstein and Enrique Desmond Arias, Violent Democracies in Latin America (Duke 
University Press, 2010). 
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The limited effective response of the governmental institutions has drastically 
portrayed a negative sentiment to the citizens that has impacted the incentive of proper 
collaboration to fight together. Additionally, the active participation of state agents in 
criminal activities has further amplified the repercussions from crime, has converted the 
institutions into accomplices of violence, and reproduces further impunity. This 
overarching impunity has shattered the trust of citizens, deepening the damage to the 
legitimacy of the regime.35 Since at least 2012, towards the end of Calderón’s presidency, 
Mexico has been ranked as the most corrupt OECD country, according to Transparency 
International’s 2018 report on the Corruption Perception Index36. This ranking goes back 
for a much longer time, it was smartly hidden. 
2.3    THE THREE SEXENIOS 
There is a clear rampant growth in the number of deaths associated with the 
launch of the War on Drugs.37 The Mexican government decided to tackle the implicit 
relationship that existed between the drug-trade organizations and the long-standing 
political PRI rule. The levels of violence began to become more visible and negatively 
impacted the lives of citizens. PAN’s President Felipe Calderón was in a position in 
which he needed to establish decisive legitimacy and quick support, leading to making 
the most important single decision during his presidency: publicly declaring war on the 
drug trade — ordering the Mexican army to crack down on cartels in urban areas and 
 
35 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
36 Laura Calderon et al., “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico,” Analysis Through 2018, accessed 
February 11, 2021, https://www.academia.edu/40919565/Organized_Crime_and_Violence_in_Mexico. 
37 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
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along major land routes.38 He intended to not turn a blind eye to the very root of many of 
the hindering causes to Mexico. However, Calderón’s growing concern during his 
presidency became an enduring crisis of national proportions, altering Mexico’s 
perception in the eyes of the world and its people.39 
During his presidency, according to the Justice in Mexico Special Report from 
2017, no other country in the Western Hemisphere had seen such a large increase in 
either its homicide rate or in the absolute number of homicides. Between 2006 and 2011, 
the dramatic eruption of violence associated with organized crime generated more than 
50,000 casualties.40 In the efforts to reduce crime and violence, Felipe Calderón’s 
expenditures on security increased until 2010 up to seven more times than the previous 
Fox administration, however, there was no existing evidence of the real impact that the 
resources had on security and criminal justice.41 President Calderón’s strategy was built 
around his commitment to a repeated frame: 
“War without distinctions or nuances among cartels or organizations.”42 
 
President Calderón’s adoption of the “kingpin strategy” successfully fragmented 
many cartels by arresting or killing their leaders, yet caused a dramatic surge in both 
government-cartel and inter-cartel violence between 2007 and 2011. Repeated by many 
academics, Calderón’s approach and strategy have been deemed inherently flawed since 
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the beginning as they did not account for the endemic weakness of political institutions in 
the country. Many scholars claim that the war had been lost since its inception.43  
PRI’s President Enrique Peña Nieto urged for a sense of conditionality at first 
similar to his hegemonic partners in the twentieth century. His anti-drug policy focused 
on judicial and administrative reforms.44 However, despite the difference in political 
background, initial hesitancy, and vows to reverse the course and the rising violence, as 
his successor, his government then decided to adopt and follow the militarized, kingpin 
strategy of Calderón.45 A similar approach to the fight against organized crime was 
established, one that had proven to raise the amount of violence. The first connection to 
the path dependency pattern is seen, despite the demonstration of rising violence and the 
difference in political party, the strategy showed that there was not much examination of 
more cohesive approaches to protect the citizenry from visible violence in the street.  
During Peña Nieto’s first five years in office, he received record-low approval 
ratings. These ratings can be directly attributed to the perceptions of his handling of 
issues of crime, violence, corruption, most specifically after the disappearance and 
murder of dozens of students of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero in 2014. In later detail, this 
particular event will be analyzed to understand the reasoning behind some of the events 
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that have been at the center of the lost hope of many citizens46. Over 116,000 murders are 
connected to the first five years in the office of Peña Nieto. Justice in Mexico’s Special 
Report from the 2017 analysis suggests that a wide portion of Mexico’s increases in 
violence from 2015 through 2017 were related to inter-cartel and intra-cartel conflicts 
among rival drug traffickers in the wake of Guzman’s arrest in 2016.  
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, AMLO, a politician that has worked to build his 
political stature, campaigning for marginalized communities and organizing protests 
against the corruption that exists in the country, particularly PRI corruption, voiced 
having a different strategy in mind.47 In 2018, López Obrador successfully led a 
campaign that captured one of the highest election margins in Mexican political history, a 
direct representation of the fatigue of Mexican citizens with the vicious cycle of violence 
perpetrated by the last political governments. As part of his strategies, he promised to 
bring “change” to Mexico, which has resonated with the voters. He emphasized his 
commitment to uproot corruption and address the prevalent issues of poverty and 
violence. As the main strategy for his administration, he indicated his support for a 
process of social reconciliation or “amnesty” for dealing with drug traffickers and other 
criminal offenders.48 This is a different approach that might allow the country to find 
different avenues of growth and peace. As the current president, there is still some time in 
which he could follow through with his proposals and vision. So far, the population has 
 
46 Laura Calderon, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 
REPORT,” no. Data and Analysis Through 2017, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/40919564/Drug_Violence_in_Mexico_SPECIAL_REPORT. 
47 Lucy Clement La Rosa, “The Implications of López Obrador’s Security Agenda,” Justice in Mexico 
(blog), July 30, 2018, https://justiceinmexico.org/lopez-obradors-security-agenda/. 
48 Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL REPORT.” 
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not seen a significant improvement in the violence or a worthy-to-follow approach. At the 
beginning of 2020, within 8 days of the year starting, 41 homicides were reported in 
Tijuana linked to cartel violence and organized crime. Simultaneously, in Guanajuato, 
100 deaths were linked to drug-related violence in the state.49 These statistics and the one 
thing that has been showcased intensively raise the question: is freeing criminals the best 
way to ensure peace?  
2.4    STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE → DRUG VIOLENCE  
 
As Mexico is traversing a historical violent period, it is key that I attempt to 
understand it to its full complexity and at all levels.50 It is crucial to examine the social 
context, the political context, economical context, and the cultural context to explain the 
explosion of violence since organized crime has been the main aspect blamed for the 
spike in violence and the levels of insecurity.51 Mexico has been perceived as a country 
facing many challenges hindering the development of citizens and struggling to provide 
security mostly directly linked to the rising of violence.  
By introducing the kinds of violence that exist in the country, it is possible to 
dissect the embeddedness of aggression experienced. First, structural violence is defined 
as the violence exerted systematically — indirectly — by everyone who belongs to a 
certain order, in particular, governments or high-elected officials, which causes 
discomfort when talked about but leads to the experience of those who live in poverty 
 
49 Mariana Ramos, “Arranque Violento En Guanajuato Más de 100 Asesinatos Dolosos,” accessed April 5, 
2021, https://www.milenio.com/politica/comunidad/arranque-violento-guanajuato-100-asesinatos-dolosos. 




and are marginalized, the causes of violations of human rights, and great disparity.52 On 
the other hand, drug violence is defined as that which is perpetrated either by drug-
trafficking organizations or the state’s security personnel when conducting anti-criminal 
activities.53 However, this has worked hand-in-hand when thinking about the conditions 
of citizens and the lack of opportunities that exist. There is a spiral of fear that became 
embedded into the lives of the Mexican citizenry with the uncontrolled presence of drug 
gangs.  
Drug-trafficking organizations, through their notorious visible presence recently, 
have signaled that they are in control and will punish anyone who provides information to 
the government. Due to the failing efforts of the government, citizens have lost the trust 
in the institutions that can provide the safety and security necessary to live a dignified 
life. The police have not been able to credibly signal that they can regain control of the 
streets.54 This translates into structural violence that is entrenched in the system of the 
country. Drug gangs operating through visibility deepen the fears of citizens as they 
operate and recruit members in the streets, leave messages that are widely broadcasted in 
the media, and behave savagely.55 As mentioned at the beginning of the work, citizens 
are trapped in between two illegitimate forces, the drug gangs, and their criminal 
organizations, and the police who are supposed to protect them.56  
 
52 Paul Farmer, “An Anthropology of Structural Violence,” Current Anthropology 45, no. 3 (2004): 305–
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54 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
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 Most commonly, the victims of structural violence are persuaded not to perceive 
this pervasive inequality at all. It has become a type of violence built into the structure 
that exhibits certain stability.57 Mexican citizens are not just experiencing direct violence 
such as beatings, kidnappings, and rape, but also endure great suffering from expressions 
of indirect violence such as poverty, marginalization, hunger, and health threats. 
Addressing the violence as a case of structural violence is crucial in grasping the complex 
dynamics that characterized violence — such as the impunity and systematization of 
violence and the social forces, policies, and institutions that perpetuate it,58 since finding 
answers in the past has proven so difficult.   
 This disparity of opportunities showcases that at least a million Mexican citizens 
have “jobs” dedicated to the rent of criminal activities.59 This market sector, while 
smaller in profits compared to the 20-billion-dollar drug trade with the United States, 
accounts for a portion of the deaths the country experiences. This market includes 
extortions, kidnappings, internal drug markets, and robberies.60 Scholar Sicilia mentions 
how violence in many ways comes from being forgotten, from being denied 
opportunities, and from being taken advantage of.61 For example, the expenditure of 
197,000 million pesos in public security in 2010 represents approximately the same 
amount, around 93%, of the expenditure directed towards public education and is above 
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the amount assigned to the health and the social development sector.62 If there were more 
opportunities for personal growth and development, the likelihood of citizens going the 
“easier and profitable” route would be reduced. The Mexican government has to create 
some kind of strategy that reduces the gaps that lead individuals to follow a life of crime 
or become accomplices of one.  
 
62 Elena Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre,” Desacatos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 





SCHOLARLY REVIEW – APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE 
 
Galtung introduces a quite philosophical, yet more encompassing definition of 
violence in his study of “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Violence is a word that 
is commonly used in terms that are related to more noticeable violence such as physical 
harm. Galtung defines violence “as the cause of the difference between the potential and 
the actual, between what could have been and what is.” This paper seeks to provide a 
foundation to understand the realities of Mexico, analyzing through Galtung’s definition 
of violence, to reason the impact that the failure of institutions to provide basic societal 
needs and opportunities has on citizenship well-being. Violence is that which increases 
the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of 
the distance.1 In Mexico, this is a violence that can be claimed to be part of the country 
since long ago, a kind of violence that further fuels the current drug violence. On a more 
ordinary and common knowledge level, Osorio, following Kalybas, defines violence as 
the deliberate infliction of physical harm on people or damage on their property that can 
be inflicted for several tactical and strategic reasons. Some of these reasons include 
eliminating a specific target or preventing certain behaviors.2 This kind of violence has 
been perceived to have grown due to the presence of organized crime, however, it is also 
portrayed through patriarchal attitudes which will be mentioned throughout the chapter. 
 
1 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–
91. 
2 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
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Organized crime has portrayed that there is another path for citizens to “provide” for their 
families. In this thesis, both definitions will be used and I will be clear on when to use 
each to provide the best description to the reader. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I will introduce the research conducted by previous 
scholars on the different approaches to violence in Mexico. Figure 1 Breakdown of 
Approaches to Violence in Mexico illustrates comprehensively the violence that can be 
presumed to exist by the existing literature. Structural violence, representing the most 
encompassing, can be found as that from which all the others stem. Section 3.1 explains 
political and national domestic violence as those that are entrenched in the government 
and nation – through ordinary expressions of violence. Section 3.2 provides a more 
comprehensive explanation of how structural violence can be perceived as the foundation 
to the continuous growth of a wealthy disparity and the acceptance of pervasive 
inequality as part of the country. Section 3.3 narrates the most relevant story to literature 
and news today, drug violence, and how it has embedded itself into the core of the 
country.   
 41 
 
3.1    ORDINARY VIOLENCE: ENTRENCHED IN THE                                                                                             
GOVERNMENT AND NATION 
 
As Mexico experiences a rise in visible violence that has affected the social, 
economic, and psychological state of its citizens, the most notable attribution can be 
given to the denouement of the War on Drugs. While it has seemed to be the most 
reasonable understanding, taking the time to look back to the time before the War on 
Drugs allows providing a more comprehensive explanation of why it escalated to the 
current dimensions. Scholar Elena Azaola explains the failed responsibility and attention 
that Mexican reporters, analysts, and citizens play to the ordinary expressions of 
violence.3 Ordinary expressions of violence encompass those that seem to be “normal” or 
part of the status quo of citizen’s lives and experiences. These so-called ordinary 
expressions of violence such as political and domestic have been in many ways linked 
and have propitiated other types of more visible violence to the public, mostly 
characterized as drug violence.   
Political violence, in this thesis, is defined as that which represents a system that 
is directly managed and influenced by the politics of a country. It defines the 
opportunities that are given for fair success to citizens, the intention to promote policies 
that grant values to all, and the role that the police forces play in the government system. 
As a result, a failure to provide all of these aspects is political violence.4 Consequently, 
National domestic violence arises from the reality that structural violence causes poverty, 
 
3 Elena Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre,” Desacatos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 
0, no. 40 (December 16, 2013): 13–32, https://doi.org/10.29340/40.253. 
4 Shirk and Wallman, “Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence.” 
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hunger, social exclusion, and humiliation causing further issues in homes.5 Scholar 
Marcelo Bergman agrees that the brutal spread of violence has not made a surprising 
apparition, however, it has been embedded and entrenched in the system. It is an 
argument that claims that Mexico is now facing the visible results of what its reality has 
always been.6  
Mexico has a history of structural violence invisibly entrenched in its culture and 
society. There is a notable inequality between citizens that persists, a distinct wealth 
disparity, and a significant lack of opportunities such as education, development, and 
social security. When saying invisible, it mostly captures the experience of privileged 
individuals in the Mexican community that has purposefully lived without thinking of the 
conditions in which the majority of the population lives.  
To reach this argument, in an extensive explanation, Elena Azaola introduces the 
perspective of understanding the current exacerbated violence by explaining the role of 
the embeddedness of violence in the culture of the country. She claims that citizens have 
clouded their view and narrowed their attention to the fight against organized crime, 
tagging the deaths and horrifying experiences to the cause, which impedes the ability to 
see other types of violence that are ingrained within the society and that ultimately 
pushed drug violence to its success.7 To Lessing, however, the biggest tragedy is that 
Mexico is not particularly a violent society, rather it is violent in structure.  
Azaola believes that three things explain the actual levels of violence — “a 
 
5 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
6 Marcelo Bergman, “La violencia en México: algunas aproximaciones académicas,” Desacatos, no. 40 
(December 2012): 67–76. 
7 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
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heredity of a previously violent Mexico, a weakening of Mexican state institutions and a 
series of misguided politics, and a conjunction of social weaknesses that are visible 
through high levels of marginalization, poverty, and lack of social inclusion.”8 The deaths 
that have taken place in the last twenty years have taken the attention and impeded to 
visualize other kinds of violence. These are all components of the facts that I have 
previously mentioned in regards to what citizens fear the most and what leads many to 
find alternatives for survival.  
When referring to the weakening of Mexican state institutions, it is interesting to 
think about the hegemonic PRI rule that lasted for many years that did not necessarily 
“weaken” the stability of the country at the time, but did impact the legitimacy and the 
development of a respectable state. The failure of institutions to have the well-being of 
citizens in mind caused a further rupture in the opportunities to build trust and 
cohesiveness. Similarly, social weakness and inequality are descriptions of what Mexico 
represents. These aspects together placed Mexico in a place of vulnerability where the 
intention of simply wanting to be “better” became a war zone and an area of lost hope.  
While it seems that homicides have increased and garnered the attention of the 
media, Azaola, surprisingly, argues that homicides constitute the last expression of 
violence in Mexico, which is the most severe and irreparable, but do not constitute a large 
proportion of the other manifestations of violence that exist. She claims that other forms 
of violence leave small prints and cause damage that becomes more profound and alters 
the lives of many citizens, limits or blocks their developmental possibilities, and, overall, 
 
8 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” Pg. 68 
 44 
 
has an impact on the collective society.9 As shortly mentioned in the beginning, the 
expressions of violence begin and are mostly represented in the intimacy of citizen’s 
homes, where the frustration and lack of educational opportunity deeply impact family 
development and formation. This is an important argument as it represents how the main 
concern of the governmental administrations and where most of their expenditures go to 
might not be what they should be prioritizing.  
3.2    STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: WEALTH DISPARITY AND 
ACCEPTED INEQUALITY 
 
Galtung provides a detailed recognition of looking beyond the common 
understanding of drug violence, bloodshed, and physical tragedy. Referencing back to his 
definition of violence, as the potential versus the actual, it is the capacity that a society 
has to develop avenues of opportunity for its citizens to live a dignified life, but that is 
not being taken advantage of or offered.10 Mexico, in the eyes of many scholars, is a 
country that has embedded structural violence into its culture.11 Structural violence 
represents the framework characterized by poverty, social inequality, and gender 
inequality. This failing potentiality is a representation of structural violence from the 
government institutions to its citizens. These structures of violence, however, are not 
limited to poverty and lack of opportunities but manifested in high levels of lawlessness, 
corruption, impunity, and the absence of a rule of law.12 Structural violence refers to the 
 
9 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
10 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–
91. 
11 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
12 Felipe Jácome, “Trans-Mexican Migration: A Case of Structural Violence,” n.d., 31. 
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harm inflicted by the social forces that systemically assault and hinder human dignity, 
constrain agency, and prevent people from meeting their basic needs.13 This concept was 
developed by Galtung in 1969 and has been used to address the toll of social structures 
such as grinding poverty, racism, and sexism on the most disadvantaged populations of 
the world. Mexico, by having embedded structural violence in its system, triggers other 
kinds of violence. Although, the object suffering from structural violence can be 
persuaded to not realize or perceive this violence at all.14 
According to Felipe Jácome, this type of violence requires a clear understanding 
of the “impunity that characterizes it, the systemic nature of its perpetration, and the 
social forces, policies, and institutions that continue to perpetuate it.”15 It is indeed in 
Mexico that silence and violence have become the centers of dominion for the country. 
There is a tremendous disproportion of opportunities that have been made much more 
difficult to overcome with an illicit profitable market calling the attention of underserved 
populations. When Jácome speaks about structural violence, he does so through his 
studies of trans-Mexican migration and the experiences of migrants when they attempt to 
reach the US-Mexico border. 
 Structural violence is not particular to Mexico; however, it is a systemic exertion 
in which all members of society indirectly partake due to its embeddedness in the system 
structure. According to a study by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, Farmer joins in the 
conversation claiming that this violence is the experience of people who might live in 
 
13 Ibid. Pg. 38. 
14 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” 
15 Jácome, “Trans-Mexican Migration: A Case of Structural Violence.” 
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poverty, are marginalized, suffer from gender equality, or experience all 
simultaneously.16 Similar to Azaola, for Farmer, the efficacy of the concept of structural 
violence lies in its ability to render visible the social machinery of oppression. The 
violence of inequality is structural and it has been normalized, however, it plays a huge 
role in the exacerbation that individuals see today making a key point of analysis.  
 The exclusion from areas in society such as education and labor opportunities are 
factors that propitiates manifestations of violence. According to the National Council on 
Population, 3.7 million children under the age of 17 did not go to school in 2010, and 7 
million young people 18-29 years of age did not study or had a job. Studies suggest that 
the young population lacks the incentive to stay in school because there is a shortage of 
labor opportunities that suit their areas of studies and interests. As a result, many of these 
young people opt to shift towards informal or criminal activities.17 The exclusion and 
privation from opportunities keep exacerbating structural violence since citizens do not 
feel tied to a society and community aspect.  
The description of violent democracies introduces, relevant to this case, how 
violence affects political practice and the subjectivity of individuals in general.18 
Violence has influentially remained as an instrument for political rule and resistance –
becoming a mechanism for keeping in place the very institutions and policies that 
democracies have fashioned and as an instrument for coping with the same problems they 
 
16 Paul Farmer, “An Anthropology of Structural Violence,” Current Anthropology 45, no. 3 (2004): 305–
25, https://doi.org/10.1086/382250. 
17 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
18 Goldstein and Arias, Violent Democracies in Latin America. 
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generate.19 Violence has let structural violence persist for years. Goldstein and Desmond-
Arias claim that in this type of democracy, rather than seeing it as a failure of democratic 
governance and institutions, they call attention to “violence as an element integral to the 
configuration of the institutions – necessary for their maintenance and as an instrument 
for the challenges to their legitimacy.”20 To this concept, these scholars add the idea of 
violent pluralism. Violent pluralism refers to the paradox of dynamic, democratic 
practices that “elect certain actors to political power while coexisting with other actors 
who are fighting for control of territories where corruption, oppression, and coercive 
forms” are necessary to maintain democracy.21 The argument expresses that there is a 
need for a parallel dynamic in which violence is endemic to the process of fighting it to 
ensure a better chance for success. 
Goldstein and Arias suggest that violent pluralism offers a way to think about 
violence, not just as indicative of democratic failure, but see it as a critical foundation of 
democracies in Latin America, critical to the maintenance of such democracies, and part 
of the political behavior of democratic citizens. Violent pluralism allows to see the role 
that violence plays in preserving a particular form of democracy and not as a way of 
stepping away from it.22  
 There are complex dimensions needed to be understood about the brutality that is 
taking place and the social structures perpetuating this violence.23 For example, it is often 
 
19 Ibid.  
20 Goldstein and Arias. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jácome, “Trans-Mexican Migration: A Case of Structural Violence.” Pg. 3 
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ignored how certain expressions of violence, significantly family and institutional 
violence as a response to patriarchal attitudes, can be linked to and proliferate other forms 
of violence. As I will explain further, this type of violence has been extending beyond 
what individuals usually study because the aggressive and visible drug violence takes all 
the attention. To properly fight against violence and provide any possible remedies, it is 
necessary to understand the root causes.  
The Justice in Mexico Report labels data and analysis of trends that have 
successfully separated the signals from the noise that frequently reaches scholars and 
researchers from other parts of the world.24 It is a source that provides a better 
understanding of the facets, implications, and possible remedies to the ongoing crisis of 
violence, corruption, and human rights violations associated with the war on drugs which 
will be used throughout my analysis. 
3.3    DRUG VIOLENCE: THE STORY TODAY 
 
Drug violence results from organized criminals using violence against state 
authorities in an attempt to maintain the power structures that permit them to extract 
profits from illicit markets.25 Osorio in his study defines drug violence as the violence 
that is perpetrated either by drug-trafficking organizations or the state’s security 
personnel when conducting anti-criminal activities.26 Numerous times, to establish 
credibility and fear, convoys of highly armed hitmen carrying high-caliber weapons 
 
24 Laura Calderón, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 
REPORT,” no. Data and Analysis Through 2017, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/40919564/Drug_Violence_in_Mexico_SPECIAL_REPORT. 
25 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
26 Ibid.  
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battled members of rival criminal groups or government authorities amid crowded public 
areas.27 Not surprisingly, organized crime is a major contributor to Mexico’s problems of 
violence and fear. To Osorio, the term organized in organized crime refers to the ability 
of individual criminals to overcome dilemmas of collective action and coordinate efforts 
to conduct violence and engage in criminal activities. Following Reuter, organized crime 
is a set of stable, hierarchically organized groups of criminals with the ability to use 
violence – or the threat of it – for acquiring or defending control of illegal markets to 
extract economic benefits from them. 
Mexico’s story today is narrated through the lens of the uprising drug violence 
that persists in the country, mostly focused on the years following the end of the 
twentieth century. As introduced, this paper seeks to bring attention to how violence was 
experienced before the uprising and how that background of violence potentially became 
visible from the beginning of President Calderón’s administration. Drug violence is 
pervasive in Mexico today as a result of violent encounters between drug trade 
organizations, the government forces, and an environment that presents fear.  
The strategy proposed by the presidency of Felipe Calderón more often than not 
resulted in negative consequences in terms of the violent repercussions from the 
fragmentation and competition within and among criminal organizations.28 The 
democratization eroded the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal 
organizations, while tied to the motivation of politicians to fight crime to establish 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL REPORT.” 
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legitimacy. What followed was a triggered wave of violence between the state and 
organized crime and among criminal groups fighting to control valuable key territories.29 
 Calderón’s approach pushed Mexico into a new equilibrium in which the presence 
of militarized drug war became the new normal.30 The city centers and their surroundings 
became places in which the inter-cartel war became commonplace, where the cartels 
fought the state for power, and where it was difficult to differentiate whether it was a war 
zone or citizens’ homes. Populations became displaced. In Calderón’s words, the “social 
fabric” was being rented. This raises the role of state violence, since according to Osorio, 
state violence motivates criminals to conduct violent retaliation against authorities and 
generates opportunities for criminal organizations to engage in violent competition 
against their rivals.31  
For example, the main violent events in Tamaulipas in 2005, that precipitated the 
operative “Mexico Seguro” and the absolute chaos in the state of Michoacán in 2006 
previewed an extremely bloody fight with cartels and intercartel. Mexico Seguro was part 
of an integral strategy by the government to combat organized crime more decisively and 
find proof to prosecute dangerous criminals who are at the margins of corruption and 
citizen intimidation. The operation sent out 700 army troops and federal police officers 
into Nuevo Laredo to then be extended throughout the country.32 As a result of these 
unprecedented militarized deployments, annual drug-related homicides nearly doubled. 
Followed by the War on Drugs, the escalation and intensity of these strategies were 
 
29 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
30 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 
31 Osorio, “Democratization and Drug Violence in Mexico.” 
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impossible to know and measure, nonetheless today we know that, as Bergman claims, 
we have been witnesses to significant and fiery violence.33 
Mexico’s drug war can be ultimately understood as a product of domestic politics 
and policies.34 For example, Tijuana has been a city experiencing violence at 
unprecedented levels. Scholars in a Justice for Mexico: Policy Brief speak on the 
difference of characteristics of violence in 2015-2017 vs 2008-2010 when the city 
experienced the change in the disruption of the Sinaloa Cartel leadership, after Joaquin 
“El Chapo” Guzman was recaptured and in the waiting time up to his extradition to the 
United States and tied to the emergence of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). 
The violence in 2015-17 tended to be more geographically concentrated in the outskirts 
of the city where the most impacted were the marginalized and poor communities. In 
contrast, they claim that the levels of violence that had been experienced in 2008-2010 
were highly visible – impacting the city’s previous public security crisis. In this earlier 
period, there was a greater frequency of high-profile violence such as “running gun 
battles in the streets, mass casualty accidents, bodies hanging from bridges, gangland-
style executions,” which impacted dramatically the life of all parts of the city.35  
Scholars Angela Duran-Martinez and Benjamin Lessing support general 
conclusions of labeling organized crime as a key driver of violence in Mexico. Similarly, 
they support claims of the harms caused by corruption and collusion of criminal 
organizations in the illicit drug trade. Most importantly, they stand by the argument of the 
 
33 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
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failure of current government strategies to address the uprising levels of drug violence in 
the streets.36 The loss of trust in institutions is a result of reports claiming the reality that 
the Federal, State, and Municipal Police forces are main perpetrators of violence in 
Mexico state from the existing collusion with DTOs.37 
 During the last elections in 2018, Mexico’s number of drug-related homicides 
rose 15% from the previous year reaching a record high. Most intensely, Mexican cartels 
killed at least 130 politicians and candidates in the lead-up to the elections.38 The 
heightened violence has been portrayed in all aspects of the country harming citizens 
from all directions. The process of democratization and attempting to suppress violence 
has led to further incentives to propagate it when drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) 
want to pursue a goal. Additionally, the harm to social capital and development has 
pushed many young individuals to follow a life of crime because of the presence of 
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THE MEXICAN CASE – THEORY 
 
As introduced throughout the scholarly review, Mexico can be described to have a 
variety of approaches to violence. To present my theory and argument, as an attachment 
and build up from Figure 1, I have created Figure 2 Breakdown of Approaches and Types 
of Violence in Mexico to illustrate the arguments succinctly provided by scholars 
visualizing how violence can be experienced through different spectrums, but with the 
respective types of violence that demonstrate how each is presented and impacting the 
citizenry.  
Figure 2 goes into a deeper analysis of the interconnectedness that exists between 
the kinds of violence and who the main individuals who are affected by it are. The extent 
to which the War on Drugs further fueled social violence can be broken into four types of 
violence that are experienced in the recurring violent events that take on in the streets. 
Through the analysis of the three administrations, it will be possible to measure the 
entanglement of each type of violence to its main approach and how it is affecting 
security, citizenship well-being, displacement, and human rights. Section 4.1 will provide 
more information on how the literature provided by scholars and the approaches to 
violence can unfold into the types of violence. Section 4.2 will have each type of violence 
broken down as a four-way argument and defined to provide a better understanding as the 
analysis takes place in the following section. Section 4.3 dives into the examination of the 
three administrations and critical events in each that portray the different levels of 
violence that Mexico has experienced –through an interpretation of the path dependency 
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4.1    THE LENGTH AND LEVELS OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 
 
The main conclusions that have been drawn by the scholarship allow formulating 
an argument in which it is recognized that violence has been entrenched into the Mexican 
system and the roots of its history. The previously “controlled” social impact of violence 
had been successfully hidden to avoid the involvement of citizens in a more visible arena. 
Through a better understanding of the violence in the past, it is possible to say that 
invisibility did not mean that there was a lack of harm.1 Instead, there was harm that had 
been allowed to permeate aspects of the development of better opportunities and 
becoming a factor in the way Mexico constructs its systems, infrastructures, policies, and 
avenues for growth. The failure of institutions and policies has been a driver to the 
exacerbation of violence in the streets, the violence perceived by citizens, and the 
 
1 Angelica Duran-Martinez, The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia 
and Mexico (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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aggression that has become part of the status quo. The structural inequality has built an 
arena for violence to come in and alter the formation of cohesive community building and 
prosperity.  
As a result, the research question will be studied from an evaluation of the types 
of violence that exist in the country to analyze the extent and impact they have on the 
current state of the country. Introducing the types of violence that derive from structural 
violence, including political, domestic, and drug violence is crucial to understanding the 
current state of Mexico as illustrated by Figure 2 Breakdown of Approaches and Types of 
Violence in Mexico. These are characteristics that tend to be pushed to the side and 
hidden when trying to understand the disproportionate growth of violent attacks and 
hatred that exists between citizens. As violence has become visible, the violence that is 
perceived more notably and receives the most attention include inter-cartel, government-
cartel, cartel-citizens, and government-citizens. The spillover of physical, emotional, and 
psychological abuse has permeated the country in ways that distort what life should be 
like and damages citizen’s livelihoods.  
There is an unfolding narrative when analyzing the various approaches of 
violence that exist in the country. Structural violence represents the main level from 
which political, domestic, and drug violence arise. Political violence is a representation of 
a system that is directly managed and influenced by the politics of a country: the 
opportunities that are given for fair success to citizens, the intentions to promote policies 
that grant values to all, and the role that police forces play on the government system. As 
pictured in Figure 2, the violence derived as government-citizens is represented by 
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political violence. On the other hand, national domestic violence represents a much more 
private and intimate type of disturbance. In Mexico, family violence is one of the social 
institutions with the highest degree of brutality. These behaviors are a response to the 
socio-economic and political exclusions that make it seem that violent behavior is the 
only option within their circumstances.2 This is a type of violence that occurs citizen-
citizen, based on the research available, it is mostly portrayed at home because of the 
patriarchal society, but also, as an expression of the frustration that arises from the lack of 
opportunities. Drug violence is the one that holds the reputation as the most violent, 
brusque, and overpowering in the country. The statistics about executions and homicides 
clearly show that after the War on Drugs there was an exponential growth in the number 
of deaths associated with its launch.3 Drug violence does entail many brutal components 
which makes its reach more noticeable. It is important to mention that drug violence is 
the visible intention to pursue a profit despite harming the lives of others, however, 
diving further into the role that the system deficiencies play in making it much more 
destructive is critical. 
4.2    THE FOUR-WAY ARGUMENT: TYPES OF VIOLENCE 
 
I identified four drivers, types of violence, that have been present in the 
exacerbation of violence in Mexico since the decision to launch the War on Drugs 
leading to further fuel social violence. The four different perspectives, based on the 
 
2 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
3 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
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various types of violence, intercartel, government-cartel4, cartel-citizens, and 
government-citizens will be defined. With the analysis of specific events in each 
administration, it will illustrate when each type is portrayed in action.  
Inter-cartel violence is that which takes place when drug trade organizations 
partake in conflict and fight for territory, power, and control.5 Analyzing the rise in inter-
cartel violence after 2006 can bring an understanding of how impactful it has been in 
daily life. The inter-cartel turf war has been dominant in Mexico, as this fighting amongst 
cartels triggered the initial state crackdown and continues to account for the bulk of the 
violence. 6 When a government targets a DTO’s leader, it weakens the organization, 
creating incentives for other cartels to challenge its control over trafficking routes and for 
lower-rank members to fight for a leadership position.7 The competition for territory, 
routes, and support from the government is the main key driver for disagreement as the 
strategic points increase the profitability of the organization as mentioned in Section 2.1. 
For example, in 2008, with the separation of an important member of the Arellano-Felix 
Organization (AFO), Teodoro Garcia Simental, with the support from the Sinaloa Cartel, 
the number of homicides in Tijuana increased by almost 300% percent and periods of 
extreme violence lasted until 2010. The homicide rate in Tijuana rose from 49 to 80 per 
100,000 inhabitants.8 Inter-cartel disruptions and fights lead to increases in violence.  
 
4 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
5 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
in Mexico,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 4, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963836. 
6 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 
7 Calderón et al., “The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico.” 
8 Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf.” 
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Government-cartel violence is that in which the Calderón administration more 
formally engaged in by directly tackling drug trade organizations in its efforts to suppress 
their presence in society. This violence is a result of the altercations between the policies 
and strategies of the military and the defense mechanisms brought by organized crime. 
Formally measuring the extent of increasing government-cartel violence can provide an 
image of the impact that it has had on social violence. Scholar Benjamin Lessing argues 
about the importance of the puzzle that government-cartel conflict poses, claiming that it 
is usually overlooked by scholars who are more focused on inter-cartel violence, while it 
accrues intense violent encounters.9 The current statistics and the trends of violence all 
coincide that the intervention of the government in the War on Drugs has had an 
important role in the unleashing of high-intensity violence.10 Referencing the situation in 
Tijuana during 2008, as the government dismantled the Arellano-Felix Organization 
(AFO), it caused again a brief increase of violence in the following months, but homicide 
rates began to decline significantly briefly after a subsequent organization remained.11 
This demonstrates that this fight for territory can be short when and only a new reigning 
power resides in the territory. Consequently, a question that can be raised is: whether or 
not the government should get involved in and when DTOs fight for territorial control? 
As has been the case, the spike in violence can be correlated to the involvement of the 
government.  
Cartel-citizens violence can be seen when organized crime actively pursues 
 
9 Benjamin Lessing. 
10 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
11 Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf.” 
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actions that are harmful to citizens when furthering drug-related activity goals, when 
demonstrating power, and when threatening them to join their organizations. This 
violence has been portrayed through mass killings, kidnappings, assaults, and robberies in 
which there has not been a limit on the innocent and forced involvement of innocent 
individuals. It is crucial to see to what extent cartel-citizens violence has grown, and if, 
exponentially, to determine the role of the policies after 2006. Additionally, the direct 
involvement of DTOs with citizens raises the dangerous possibility of citizens getting 
engaged in criminal behavior: from threats or as a response to the structural deficiencies 
reducing other alternatives. Violent behaviors and approaches are a response to the socio-
political and socio-economic exclusions that make violence seem like the only viable 
option.12 
Government-citizen violence is the aggression that happens between the policies 
and approaches taken by the government, which can be considered irrational but 
connected to the failed desire and effort to provide safety and stability to the citizens. 
Analyzing to what extent government-citizens violence keeps growing and how there are 
no efforts to restructure the inequality that arises from structural deficiencies is important. 
More often than not, it has been clear that the pursuits for power of the leadership have 
overpowered the intention to provide access to basic opportunities and provide rightful 
services to citizens.  
 There is an alarming presence of weakness and fragility in many Mexican citizens 
leading them to enter the world of violence. Many things have been wrongly enacted 
 
12 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
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making this to become the only option.13 Additionally, despite having a full monopoly of 
the legitimate use of violence, the police forces and National Guard continue to exceed 
themselves in the use of violence in the country for the wrong reasons, demonstrating 
increased rates of state violence.14 According to the statistics provided by Blanco, it is 
clearly outlined that there is a drastic decrease in the trust of institutions and that many 
citizens fear for their safety as violence comes from the same people that are meant to 
protect them.  
 When it is the authorities that have gone above the law, the effects are drastically 
more severe, since their actions become the principles of social trust, and put into doubt 
the legitimacy of power, undermine the trust and credibility that citizens have on them, 
and destroy whatever linkages left that make social cohesion possible.15 As mentioned at 
the beginning of Chapter 2, while the interruption of a hierarchical bribe system occurred, 
it did not mean that it was completely eliminated. Corruption continues to be a main 
component of Mexican life and rule, as a result of lack of opportunities and thirst for 
power, hindering the legitimacy of institutions and trust in governmental organizations 
and police forces.  
4.3    ANALYSIS: PATH DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE 
THREE SEXENIOS 
 
Throughout this section, the three presidential administrations and critical events 
in each that portray different levels of violence will be examined. The analysis will be 
 
13 Bergman, “La violencia en México.” 
14 Ibid.  
15 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
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conducted through an interpretation of the path dependency theory as a result of the 
strategies and policies. Beginning with Section 4.3.1, events during the presidency of 
Calderón will be presented and interpreted based on the policy strategies that his 
administration put forward. Section 4.3.2 details Enrique Peña Nieto’s policies and 
critical circumstances during his administration that portray the violence embedded in the 
country’s structure. Lastly, Section 4.3.3 will dive into the current administration under 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador and key events during his first years.  
 
Figure 3 labeled Timeline of Events illustrates fourteen major events and specific 
dates where Mexico represents an emblem and umbrella of diverse violence. I will 
thoroughly explain and analyze two events per administration to see the types of violence 
that are seen in the country in each respective event while considering the strategies 
proposed by each president. These events illustrate the role that the different types of 
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violence perpetuated play and aid in answering the second research question on the 
effects of security, citizenship well-being, displacement, and human rights. Through these 
events, it is possible to see the impact that the violence can have depending on the 
approach it comes from and the intention behind the exacerbation of them.  
4.3.1    FELIPE CALDERÓN (2006-2012) 
 
President Felipe Calderón had three strategy objectives: to recover the lost 
territory in the hands of criminal organizations that was slowly taken away for several 
years, to reduce the production and flow of illegal drugs into Mexico by directly tackling 
fields and areas of its agriculture, and to finish with the gravely detrimental crimes and 
effects to Mexican society such as extortions and kidnappings.16 During this time, the 
newly introduced fight against DTOs brought violence into the streets making it a part of 
the lives of citizens.  
President Felipe Calderón chose the state of Michoacán to launch his military 
offensive against the cartels at the beginning of the war as part of a political and strategic 
end.17 As illustrated in Figure 2, I have presented five events during the administration 
where violence impacted citizenship well-being and state safety. During the event labeled 
as the “Michoacanazo,” on May 27, 2009, Mexican authorities arrested 27 high-ranking 
officials suspected of collaborating with drug-trafficking organizations in the state.18 
When operationalizing ordinally the statistics of this date, the extent can be categorized 
 
16 Vilalta, “How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly?” 
17 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 




as high involvement, involvement, and low involvement. The government members 
faultily involved in this operation can be considered to be highly involved. Additionally, 
the number of high-ranking officials represents a large presence of leadership in 
organized crime including ten mayors, a judge, and aid to the governor of Michoacán. 
The ratio of involved members is a significant statistic based on the state and the reality 
that there should not have been any at all, even less of high-ranking and influential 
positions. The drug trade in Michoacán is controlled by the La Familia cartel - considered 
to be one of the most violent DTOs in Mexico. These arrests followed as a result of the 
captures of suspected members of the La Familia cartel, who decided to share who were 
the government officials that facilitated their work and helped them accomplish their 
goals. This event is a representation of a wave of detentions in which the government 
went against a large group of mayors – showcasing government-citizen violence and 
government-cartel violence. Government-citizen violence stems from the innocent lives 
that were impacted through the street operations, as well as, the failed responsibility to 
promote a legitimate system of protection – structural violence. Additionally, it 
represents political violence as these government officials are inherently acting against 
what their political responsibilities are. The suppression of the bribe system was 
supposed to help reduce corruption, nonetheless, this event represents that the implicit 
relationships between the government leaders and cartels are prevalent. Government-
cartel violence is, similarly, a spillover from the strategy of Calderón and action to 
combat illicit activities.  Among the detained mayors was the mayor of Uruapan who had 
received, earlier that year, a message from a cartel organization, given through the 
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dumping of human heads on the dance floor of a bar – representing cartel-citizen 
violence, a way of communicating by the cartels to put a point across, but taking innocent 
lives in the process. The savagery and inhumanity of these messages show that there is a 
spillover of physical, emotional, and psychological abuse that damages citizen’s 
livelihoods. 
On August 24, 2010, following a gunfight in the state of Tamaulipas between 
gunmen, alleged to be drug traffickers, in which four people were killed – three gunmen 
and a marine – 72 more bodies were recovered from a remote ranch. The Tamaulipas 
Massacre is known to be “the biggest single discovery of its kind.”19 As a result of the 
deaths of defense units and organized crime members, this event represents government-
cartel violence and inter-cartel war. From the bodies recovered, cartel-citizen violence, 
the 58 men and 14 women were believed to be migrants from South and Central America 
detained before they attempted to cross the US-Mexico border. The bodies were found in 
a room piled up on top of each other.20  
A surviving migrant has claimed that they were kidnapped by the Los Zetas cartel 
and killed after refusing to work for them.21 This particular event brings back Jacome’s 
description of structural violence hitting trans-Mexican migration. In this operation, 
officials seized 21 rifles, 101 ammunition clips, bullet-proof vests, camouflage uniforms, 
and vehicles. When operationalizing this continuously, the ratio from the statistics of this 
 
19 Robin Emmott, “Drug Hitmen Dump 72 Bodies at Mexican Ranch,” Reuters, August 26, 2010, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-drugs-idUSTRE67O2NF20100826. 
20 William Booth, “Survivor: Drug Gang Massacred 72 Migrants in Northern Mexico,” August 26, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/25/AR2010082506776.html. 
21 Ibid.  
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date shows the high amount of lives lost, the confiscation of vehicles, and the seizing of 
high-caliber weapons. Ordinally, it is possible to measure the level of cruelty and 
savagery of this discovery. This day shows high levels of cruelty. These statistics, 
particularly the number of deaths of innocent civilians, illuminates the reality of what 
happens when refusing to collaborate or engage in criminal activities in Mexico. While 
the policies imposed by Calderón are to reduce violence, it is critical to think of other 
avenues to provide citizens protection to deter from such encounters. The threat and 
enforcement of violence stem into other areas of the Mexican community.  
In 2010, at the Conflict Barometer from Heidelberg University, the violence in 
Mexico was comparable to that of Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan, where brute force was 
utilized constantly, in a structured and systematic manner.22 The path dependency pattern 
could potentially show that with Calderón’s approach to combating violence an even 
higher presence of violence was established through heightened inter-cartel war and 
government-cartel violence. The argument that “developmental trajectories are inherently 
difficult to reverse” show that as violence rose, it became a more common ground for 
those patterns to follow. Additionally, available measures such as the cartel-government 
homicides presented by the SNSP database and the Freedom of Information Act reports 
from the army about cartel attacks versus the government reveal that it escalated by a 
scale of magnitude during Calderón’s administration.23  
 
22 Elena Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre,” Desacatos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 
0, no. 40 (December 16, 2013): 13–32, https://doi.org/10.29340/40.253. 
23 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars. 
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Calderon’s strategy brings back Alexander’s sample study of democratic 
consolidation where it was based on a rational choice framework, where his 
administration chose to impose an approach fighting the history of embedded institutions 
of corruption and protection, because of the trade-off of short-term costs for long-term 
improvements. As claimed by some scholars, this war could have potentially been lost 
since the beginning because institutions were inherently flawed and permeated with 
weakness.24 Path dependence is perceived to be the result of a rational cost-benefit 
calculation – targeting the leaders was the tactic believed to provide the most security in 
the long run. The PAN was interested in reducing drug flows and corruption at the cost of 
short-term violence and tackling the struggle directly to end the corrupting pattern. 
Nonetheless, as seen from the government-cartel interactions, these have accounted for 
the stemming of further violence into the streets.  
4.3.2    ENRIQUE PEÑA NIETO (2012-2018) 
 
Enrique Peña Nieto campaigned with a variety of approaches and intended 
strategies in his attempt to protect citizens and bring back support to the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, PRI. While homicides experienced a decrease from 2011 through 
2014, the number began to rebound during the last half of Peña Nieto’s administration, 
with levels exceeding those of the Calderón administration.25 Based on INEGI’s official 
statistics from 2013-2016 and with slight projections for 2017, it appeared that 
approximately 116,000 people were murdered over the first five years of Peña Nieto’s 
 
24 Vilalta, “How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly?” 
25 Calderon et al., “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico.” 
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term, which represents nearly more than 4,000 per year than his predecessor.26  
During his time as president, the International Security Law (LSI) gave Peña 
Nieto the power to order Mexico’s federal security forces, including the two branches of 
the Armed Forces (Army and Navy), to intervene when wanting to address any security 
threats if other authorities were deemed incapable of doing so.27 This granting of power 
represented the need to use stronger force when addressing threats from DTOs as his 
intended strategy was focused on internal national security. Additionally, the fight against 
the War on Drugs continued, showing the path dependency pattern where governments 
struggled to find distinct alternatives to combat violence.  
During his administration, the Iguala Mass Kidnapping in 2014 garnered the 
attention and the frustration of Mexican citizens and worldwide. On September 26, 2014, 
students from a teacher training school in southern Mexico took some buses on their way 
to Mexico City for a demonstration. However, those buses never arrived – 43 students 
went missing along the way, without much explanation. As time went on and a huge 
amount of failed investigations took place, it was presumed that they were killed around 
the town of Iguala.28 To this day, their remains have never been found and their deaths 
have been blamed on corrupt local politicians and police officials, as well as, higher 
leadership in the Mexican military, government, and drug-trade organizations. 
While this investigation and debates on the truth have been ongoing for at least 6 
 
26 Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL REPORT.” 
27 Ibid.  
28 Lulu Garcia Navarro and Anabel Hernandez, “What Happened To Mexico’s Missing 43 Students In ‘A 





years now, scholar Anabel Hernandez in her new book, A Massacre in Mexico: The True 
Story Behind the Missing 43 Students, shares more specific aspects about the truth of 
what happened that day based on her extensive and brave research. The official version 
always stated that the army and the Federal Police knew nothing about what happened 
and heard after a couple of hours what had presumably happened. Nonetheless, 
Hernandez’s investigation – official reports and interviews with drug criminal informants 
– allowed her to discover that the army and Federal Police, not just were aware, but were 
chasing the students for at least three hours before the attack. These government forces 
were waiting for the students, as they changed buses, and targeted only two of the five 
buses that had onboarded students. She answers the question about why the Federal 
Police opened fire against the buses and why the students disappeared.  
According to her investigations, those two buses had been monitored by armed 
forces because they had a secret compartment carrying two million dollars of heroin 
without the knowledge of those onboard, but with the awareness of the army and Federal 
police. The aftermath of this event led Mexico into a political crisis amid shifting 
explanations and inconclusive investigations. As victims of the circumstance, these 
students had boarded buses that were being used by DTOs to transport drugs. Hernandez 
claims that her source, an informant of a high-ranking DTO leader, labels the first 
responsibility of the crime to the colonel that received the order to rescue the drugs.29 
This crime remains full of impunity and represents a flashback to the implicit 
relationships that have existed in the country since before the onset of the War on Drugs. 
 
29 Lulu Garcia Navarro and Anabel Hernandez. 
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It also represents the importance of historical evaluation as the PRI’s leader was falling 
back to his previous counterparts’ old way of governing.  
The more nationwide knowledge is the conclusion that with solely finding the 
remains of one student, all were killed by a violent DTO in their pursuit of profit. These 
assumptions were the result of the case, but with inconclusive evidence to confirm any 
suspicions.30 This event represents cartel-citizens violence, government-cartel violence, 
and government-citizen violence. This case was terribly handled causing outrage because 
of the corrupted leadership and poor analysis of crucial evidence. Institutions such as the 
United Nations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and others have also 
criticized the investigation. These organizations have denounced “what they call errors, 
inconsistencies, obstruction of justice and human rights violations in the investigation, 
including repeated acts of torture against people arrested in the case.”31 In 2019, the main 
suspect named López Astudillo, a DTO member, was released because 62 of over 100 
pieces of evidence against him were deemed inadmissible for various reasons such as 
being obtained through torture methods or simply not being sufficient enough to support 
a conviction.32 The violence present and the impunity during the Peña Nieto 
administration represented the conditionality that his political party had, as well as, the 
corruption in the country being placed over giving the truth to parents and the nation.  
Even more outrageous to the Mexican citizenry, on July 27, 2015, while searching 
 
30 Dana Cornacchio, “Reopening the Case of the Mass Kidnapping in Mexico,” Panoramas, October 3, 
2019, https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-politics/reopening-case-mass-kidnapping-mexico. 
31 Lulu Garcia Navarro and Anabel Hernandez, “What Happened To Mexico’s Missing 43 Students In ‘A 
Massacre In Mexico.’” 
32 Dana Cornacchio, “Reopening the Case of the Mass Kidnapping in Mexico.” 
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for the 43 disappeared students, another and a total of 60 mass graves were discovered in 
Iguala, Guerrero with a total of 129 bodies. None of the remains were linked to 
students.33 This discovery showcases the most possible case of cartel-citizen and 
government-citizen violence as there is an extensive death toll in the country. How is it 
possible that in the search for a significant amount of bodies and an even worse number is 
found? Mexico has established itself as a mass graveyard all over the country. 
From the three initiatives and strategies proposed by Peña Nieto, as illustrated 
later in Figure 5 labeled as The Three Sexenios’ Agenda, only the redirecting of decisions 
and responsibilities to the Government Secretary was fulfilled.34 Despite this 
implementation, the government of Peña Nieto proved to be unsuitable and highly 
corrupt, crushing the hope of citizens in the country. As path dependency evaluation, the 
decision-making of Peña Nieto showed that the strategies have failed to be implemented 
in a way that provides safety and security to the citizens. Societal well-being is difficult 
to be ensured when there is a ramping feeling of fear and disappointment with the 
country’s leadership and failed promises.  
When referencing back to North’s claim of the role of institutional development 
as subject to positive feedback – making it the role of path dependence to explain the 
patterns of institutional persistence and change35 – President Peña Nieto did follow 
 
33 Laura Martin, “Research Guides: Mexico’s Mass Disappearances and the Drug War (Ayotzinapa: The 
Missing 43 Students): Drug War Timeline 1930-2015,” accessed April 5, 2021, 
https://researchguides.library.wisc.edu/c.php?g=560513&p=3904772. 
34 Mónica del Carmen Serrano Carreto and Mónica del Carmen Serrano Carreto, “La estrategia de 
seguridad de AMLO. ¿De la pacificación a la militarización?,” Revista IUS 13, no. 44 (December 2019): 
207–28, https://doi.org/10.35487/rius.v13i44.2019.615. 
35 Pierson, “POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND PATH DEPENDENCE.” 
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previously instituted policies and strategies by President Calderón because it could have 
been potentially more difficult to attempt to reconstruct what had been previously set up. 
There was a sort of attraction towards existing institutional arrangements compared to the 
alternatives. Continuing the strategy efforts that began with President Calderón lead to 
see the pattern in decisions, mostly not thought out coherently, and the continuous 
exacerbation of violence. While it could be argued that shifting gears and attempting a 
new approach, as originally planned by the Peña Nieto administration, could have led to 
higher costs, Mexico, more than ever, saw an increase in violence that took a greater cost 
– that of human lives.  
The protection of human rights should have been placed at the forefront of this 
administration after looking at the causalities that arose from the initial launch of the War 
on Drugs during the previous administration. Path dependency decisions were the most 
logical approach to the Peña Nieto administration to avoid further repercussions from the 
lack of appropriate efforts to protect Mexican citizens. By relying on historical patterns, it 
provided a more convenient avenue to not fulfill political rights in the most efficient and 
fair way to the people.  
4.3.3    ANDRÉS MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR (2018-present) 
 
The landslide victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the 2018 presidential 
elections ushered an era of uncertainties, as well as, opportunities for Mexico. There are 
many speculations about his approach from political rivals, however, to this date, a 
similitude has been perceived from his diverse preceding counterparts. Noted as “new-old 
populism” by Felbab-Brown, López Obrador’s victory represented a dramatic change 
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being the first leftist politician to be elected.36 The crushing victory was an expression of 
protest and disillusionment the Mexican citizens felt with traditional parties – tying to the 
global tide of populism. 
The disenchantment with the traditional parties reflected the basic failures of the 
Mexican government, most reflected during the Peña Nieto administration. First, the 
high-level corruption among the Mexican political elite, involving outgoing President 
Peña Nieto, and the escalating violence that was experienced during the past 
administration kept being increasingly shoved under the rug. Second, it reflected the deep 
disappointment with Mexico’s unequal economic growth and failure to aid and empower 
many of the country’s underprivileged citizens over decades, persisting in poor public 
safety and weak rule of law.37 
 López Obrador campaigned with the dramatic promise of transforming Mexico 
through the empowerment of the underprivileged and reducing violence. As a strategy, he 
scolded the long-standing “mafia of power,” political and business elite, and vowed to 
eliminate corruption, not solely reduce it. As displayed in Figure 5 The Three Sexenios’ 
Agenda, his agenda proved to be ambitious, but largely vague. Despite his populism, the 
main key focuses of the administration are vital to Mexico – tackling the poverty, 
inequality, and marginalization of large segments of the population – as they attempt to 
reduce the gap between the two Mexico’s.  
 
36 Felbab-Brown, “Andrés Manuel López Obrador and a New Era of Politics in Mexico.” 
37 Ibid.  
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By planning to provide money for youth programs, pensions, and infrastructure – 
the economic policy agenda was deemed his most concrete plan. He claimed to be able to 
accomplish these goals without creating a large budget deficit by focusing on government 
austerity and recovering money lost to corruption. His successful mayoral period in the 
early 2000s, leaving with an 85% approval rate, was a result of the expanding social 
spending and boosting pensions. Nonetheless, the lack of a clear plan of security action 
has hindered the plans in the first years of his administration. By vaguely planning to 
reduce criminal violence, he proposed a sort of amnesty for drug traffickers, which was 
then reformulated into leniency for low-level, non-violent offenders. In Mexico, this 
leniency fails to address the key drivers of violence.38 After winning the election and 
assuming office in 2018, López Obrador announced the creation of a new National Guard 
– hybrid civilian police and military force – to fight cartels.39  
 Tied to the 2014 Iguala Mass Kidnapping, he campaigned with the promise to 
open this investigation again because it was the humane thing to do. He stated that it is 
about “justice, about humanism, and also about Mexico’s reputation,” while denouncing 
the release of key suspects to the public and the parents of victims.40 Nonetheless, parents 
have claimed in 2020 that President López Obrador has not done enough to continue the 
investigation two years after he took office. The victims’ families, as well as, the rest of 
Mexico anxiously await the prosecution of the ones responsible for this devastating act of 
violence.  
 
38 Felbab-Brown, “Andrés Manuel López Obrador and a New Era of Politics in Mexico.” 
39 Council on Foreign Relations, “Criminal Violence in Mexico.” 
40 Dana Cornacchio, “Reopening the Case of the Mass Kidnapping in Mexico.” 
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 The Battle of Culiacán can be defined as a representation of government-cartel 
and cartel-citizen violence. The city was on a battlefield – cars and buses set on fire, drug 
cartel members with high-caliber weapons in “key areas,” and citizens running for safety. 
According to the Sinaloa state’s head of security, the preliminary information showed 
two people had been killed and 21 were injured. The numbers are quantitative 
information on the impact that a few minutes had and what the government attempting to 
do the “right” thing, capturing a DTO leader, can cause. The operationalization of the 
continuous variable, the number of victims, can be stated with the statistics available. In 
this particular event, social media took a big presence with pictures and videos showing 
what appeared to be dead bodies on the streets, suggesting a much higher death toll. 
Simultaneously, during the fight, an unknown number of inmates were escaping from the 
local Aguaruto prison. Operationalizing the different variables is possible ordinally with 
the likelihood of fear measured by the comments of present witnesses such as the footage 
of a girl asking her father in fear: “Why are they shooting bullets?” This girl was highly 
experiencing trauma.41 Additionally, with the expansion of live video of the situation, the 
whole country was brought to the experience, leading to a high likelihood of frustration 
and disappointment.  
There is a significant failure of strategy in the approach to arresting criminals with 
the new National Guard proposed by President López Obrador. Despite the urge to 
change dynamics, López Obrador fell into a trap that he had mostly reprimanded from the 
 
41 Juan Carlos Perez Salazar, “El Chapo: Mexican Police Free Drug Lord’s Son as Culiacán Battle Erupts,” 




other administrations, representing a similar path dependency pattern. If wanting to say 
that he did something else, in this case, releasing a criminal, it can be demonstrated that it 
inspired an even greater source of embarrassment for the government and outlined a 
message to DTOs of the power they have in the country.  
Another emblematic event occurred as the celebrations of his first anniversary 
arrived, on December 1, 2019, where clashes sparked between cartel gunmen in Villa 
Unión killing at least 31 people. Riding into the convoy of heavily armed pickup trucks, 
gunmen sprayed the offices of the mayor of Villa Unión with bullets in a fight lasting 
approximately 1.5 hours.42 It placed President López Obrador under further pressure 
because of its proximity to the border after President Trump had announced his 
commitment to label DTOs as terrorists. As previously mentioned, President López 
Obrador has claimed his unwillingness to accept any outside intervention because 
Mexico is a “free, sovereign country”.43 This encounter was a result of government-cartel 
violence where numbers and statistics continue to be pending where 14 gunmen were 
first reported to be killed, then the state government added the death of at least 17 
others.44 Additionally, four police were also killed raising even further criticism. While 
homicides were at record high levels in 2018, they were on track to surpass them in 2019.  
The path dependency pattern resonates as President López Obrador’s strategy has 
continuously followed that of the previous administrations where the spillover of 
violence continues to take place in the country. In this case, based on his intended 
 
42 Dave Graham, “Shootings in Northern Mexico Town Kill 20, Pile Pressure on President,” Reuters, 
December 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-violence-idUSKBN1Y515O. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Graham, “Shootings in Northern Mexico Town Kill 20, Pile Pressure on President.” 
 76 
 
strategy, following the historical approaches and policies to violence was not the main 
objective. However, as the number of homicides, shoot-outs, and displays of violence 
persist, it is unreasonable to think that the strategy would not be to try capturing or 
detaining any criminals. The Battle of Culiacán showcases a day important to keep in 
mind in future scholarship as the future temporal effects, as a result of path dependency, 
could continue to rise. The decision-making process by the administration demonstrated 
that by attempting to tackle and/or fight criminal organizations, government-cartel 
violence will appear and most likely respond with destructive altercations in the streets. 
This is how DTOs show that they are higher in power compared to the government, 
signaling they can do as they please.  
These developmental trajectories of permitting violence have proven to be 
difficult to reverse. The López Obrador administration is in a position where his strategic 
steps to reducing violence are further undermining the little legitimacy left. While 
President López Obrador has been clear in his perception of both the current laws and 
institutions of the country as instruments of the corrupted establishment power that 
persists, the current method of releasing criminals to ensure peace must be re-evaluated to 
ensure that short-term decisions do not have a deeper long-term cost. His approaches 
could create a new path-dependent policy that could wrongly extend to the years to come, 




Figure 4 Notable Events with the Four-Way Argument: Types of Violence 
illustrates the arguments put forward more succinctly categorized in the respective type 
of violence that is present in the encounter. It serves as a point of reference for clarity on 
how each event can represent a variety of perspectives of violence impacting citizens 
from different directions. For example, insecurity is represented by the report of 
homicides within the first few days of the López Obrador administration, as well as, how 
the apparition of hung bodies can harm the formation of citizens as dignified, human 
beings. The secondary question is answered throughout the paper as the events and 
statistics shine a light on the disparities in offering a cohesive, wholesome development 
and ensuring stability to citizens. The different types of violence are becoming part of the 
events and exacerbated through the different tactics that the operations against DTOs 






Through the mentioning of the different events, there is a resemblance and 
notable continuation in the violence in the state perpetuated in the different levels. As a 
result, the path dependency pattern is theoretically followed by seeing in Figure 5 The 
Three Sexenios’ Agenda the intention of the security plans of the different 
administrations, but how the results of each ended in a common denominator = more 
violence. It is critical to see how such an impactful and overwhelmingly focus on 
violence and in failing humanity takes a huge toll on citizenship well-being, in the further 
displacement of homes, on the feeling of safety and security, and in ensuring dignified 
human rights to all.  
Pierson’s interpretation of path dependence as the “social processes that exhibit 
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positive feedback generating branching patterns of historical development” resonates 
with the case of Mexico’s War on Drugs.45 While there have been governmental voiced 
intentions, citizen protests, and overwhelming waves of violence, the administrations 
keep falling back into the same pattern of approaching criminal activities similarly. As a 
result, the reality of structural violence presents itself again, where Mexico needs to 
develop possible alternatives to the embeddedness of inequality and vicious realities.  
The War on Drugs was the onset of ongoing violence that preserves to this day. 
The approach by López Obrador as a Peace Plan has not demonstrated much success. It 
is important that by focusing on the prosperity of the marginalized communities, there 
exists a strong desire to fortify the areas that have had positive development and provide 
avenues for growth to actively stem individuals away from falling into the trap of illicit 
activities and crime. The strategies implemented by both President Calderón and 
President Peña Nieto, while tackled many of the DTOs and led to some arrests, did spill 
over much of the violence of the operations into the daily lives of citizens. Currently, it is 
possible to see links and similitude with the “new” approach that President López 
Obrador is taking. Violence continues to be experienced as a historically embedded part 
of the society in Mexico, of today’s reality, and unfortunately, any progress is very 
unclear for the future.  
 
 





IMPACT OF RISING VIOLENCE – BREAKING POINT 
 
According to the Citizen Perception Survey conducted in 2017 in Tijuana, 92% of 
residents think that they live in an unsafe city, while many citizens claim that they have 
personally witnessed various forms of crime – vandalism, drug sale or consumption, 
robberies, assaults, and gunshots.1 Similarly, in the study by Justice in Mexico, in 2017 
Mexico’s recent economic difficulties – stagnant economic growth, a devalued peso, a 
serious fiscal crisis due to falling oil prices – were often cited as major contributors to the 
recent increases in violence.2 
Individuals have been displaced from their homes and their businesses as a result 
of inter-cartel violence, then perpetrated as citizen-citizen violence. Unfortunately, 
violence includes a full assault on personality, dignity, and the sense of worth of all 
victims causing a tremendous negative impact on the development of citizens and a 
violation of their human rights.3 Citizens in Mexico continue to live with the expectation 
that there are very limited growth opportunities and have instead thought of more ways to 
at least go by their daily lives without feeling a constant fear.  
The rise of violence has placed citizens in an environment where it has become 
 
1 Dr Zulia Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf,” The Resurgence of Violent 
Crime in Tijuana, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/38402161/The_Resurgence_of_Violent_Crime_in_Tijuana_pdf. 
2 Laura Calderón, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL 
REPORT,” no. Data and Analysis Through 2017, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/40919564/Drug_Violence_in_Mexico_SPECIAL_REPORT. 
3 Elena Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre,” Desacatos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 
0, no. 40 (December 16, 2013): 13–32, https://doi.org/10.29340/40.253. 
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extremely difficult to trust authorities to provide the safety networks and security to live a 
protected life. Figure 6 Percentage of Corruption Perception shows the results of a 
survey of the perception and percentage of individuals in Mexico who believe that the 
people who are meant to protect them are corrupt and untrustworthy, leading to a feeling 
of constant unsafety. The data suggests the military is not being fully trusted, yet it is the 
best available option from the point of view of citizens. As President López Obrador 
suggested a National Guard, it can represent a viable option that could receive support 
from the Mexican population.4 However, a very high proportion of citizens still live in 
fear – affecting the perception of the government’s intentions, strategies, and policies.  
5 
To many observers, the violence in Mexico is not surprising given the conditions 
in which it finds itself: the profit margins from the drug trade in which DTOs engage, 
DTOs location and proximity to the United States, the supply of weapons from the 
United States, widespread corruption, weak and failing institutions, and limited legitimate 
economic opportunities that could prevent the younger generations from joining a 
criminal life.6 Despite it not being surprising, the government is responsible for 
 
4 Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear.” 
5 Ibid.  
6 Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
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establishing opportunities and the simple possibility of feeling secure at home.  
The serious risk that the problems of corruption and violence have had on the 
lives of citizens is extremely detrimental to the development of a new, strong foundation 
from which citizens can prosper. The combination of the two phenomena has drastically 
undermined Mexico’s democratic system. This, tied with the structural violence that 
persists, can show how the current efforts are not building a more cohesive state. 
Therefore, the loss of hope has to be slowly redeemed by encouraging individuals who 
have been privileged in the Mexican communities to offer avenues of prosperity to those 
who have been disadvantaged. From understanding the history of failing government 
institutions, it will be a challenge to attempt to restructure the government through 
initiatives or efforts. It will also require individual efforts and citizen-citizen support to 
encourage each other and demand better opportunities for themselves. 
5.1    MEXICO-UNITED STATES BILATERIAL RELATIONS 
 
The Mexican government and the DTOs, through much of the late twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century, when the relative “peace” existed during the PRI 
hegemony, experienced a relative equilibrium. As the competition among DTOs 
increased and the political competition began, hindering the government-cartel implicit 
relationships, the equilibrium began to break down.7 DTOs, during this time, had access 
to firearms to establish control over drug trafficking routes leading to the United States, 
but most of the violence was covert to avoid issues with the government. Since the 
 
7 Colby Goodman and Michel Marizco, “U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New Data and Insights 
Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges,” University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, n.d., 35. 
 83 
 
beginning of the twenty-first century, the more regular use of firearms in open combat as 
a result of inter-cartel war and intra-cartel war has been prevalent between each other, the 
Mexican government, and the public.  
Throughout all of the events mentioned, the Mexican DTOs are conducting their 
business in a sphere that is usually given to those with much more political stances such 
as terrorists or paramilitaries.8 The trade of weapons from the United States’ straw 
purchasers to Mexico’s drug cartels has placed the government in a disadvantaged 
position to fight the cartels successfully. DTOs are demanding more sophisticated 
firearms with larger quantities of arms and ammunition – increasing the murder rate. 
Reflecting on the Battle of Culiacán, Mexico’s democratic governance is at severe risk 
because it can no longer fight against a power that overly overpowers them.  
The profitable market of engaging in arms trafficking and smuggling tied to lack 
of opportunities and the possibility of easy gains is appealing in an environment that has 
consistently failed its citizens. The build-up of the lack of trust in institutions can be 
argued to be a result of the structural violence that stems from long before. The security 
forces have continuously become an institution that acts through corruption and bribery 
as an alternative to provide more for themselves. Throughout this analysis and research, it 
seems like many of the decisions taken by either the citizens, the security forces, or 
members of the government are of last resort or stem from generations of violence.  
During the presidency of Calderón, the most reformative effort with the United 
States began through the Mérida Initiative, a US$1.6 billion security cooperation 
 
8 Goodman and Marizco. 
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agreement, as displayed in Figure 5, where there were significant efforts and investments 
in combating the War on Drugs. The Mérida Initiative, to this day, has four main pillar 
strategies: combating transnational criminal organizations through intelligence sharing 
and law enforcement operations, institutionalizing the rule of law while protecting human 
rights, creating a “21st-century” border while improving immigration enforcement in 
Mexico, and building strong communities by piloting approaches to reduce the root 
causes of violence, reduce drug demand, and build a culture of “lawfulness” through 
education.9  
This initiative was built on the idea of a “shared responsibility” where the 
Mexican government pledged to tackle corruption and the United States government 
pledged to address the demand for drugs and the illicit arms trade. However, both 
governments have struggled to fulfill their respective commitments.10 Still, the Mérida 
Initiative continued to be the main bilateral agreement with the Peña Nieto administration 
and now with President López Obrador. Additionally, it has represented the international 
complement to the United States’ domestic efforts to reduce the demand for illegal drugs, 
reduce the trafficking of firearms and weapons, and prosecute criminals engaged in drug 
trafficking.11 
 At the beginning of President Trump’s administration, he implemented two 
executive orders to refocus the Mérida Initiative towards combatting transnational 
criminal organizations and enhancing border security – prioritizing the reduction of drug 
 
9 Clare Ribando Seelke, “Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020,” n.d., 3. 
10 Seelke. 
11 Laura Mehalko, “This Is Gun Country: The International Implications of U.S. Gun Control Policy Note,” 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 35, no. 1 (2012): 297–330. 
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production, border interdiction and security, and combating money laundering.12 As he 
finished his term, there was a stronger desire to get involved in the fight by targeting 
DTOs as terrorist organizations, placing further pressure on the government of Mexico. It 
has been very challenging to achieve a cohesive collaboration that can ensure that the 
efforts are applied in a mutual arrangement that reduces the demand for drugs in the 
United States, but most importantly, the supply of high-caliber weapons to DTOs by 
placing stricter gun controls.13 If collaborations such as the Mérida Initiative continue to 
be part of the joint efforts to suppress and combat DTOs, the United States must prioritize 
the evaluation of its role in the vicious cycle of crime stemming from its lax gun control 
laws.  
As of today, the United States Congress has increased its mission of bilateral 
efforts after the death of a family of dual citizens near the Arizona border in 2019. 
Similarly, the U.S. arrests of former Mexican public security minister in December 2019 
and the former defense minister in October 2020 on drug trafficking-related charges have 
raised concerns about the failure of Mexico to fulfill its commitment to reducing 
corruption. President López Obrador, with leftist MORENA, has voiced his desire to 
focus on the domestic and internal interests, undermining any international support and 
guidance. As of December 2020, there was a possibility of a dangerous backtrack to the 
U.S.-Mexico security relationship. As a result of the detentions, the Mexican Congress 
passed a new law severely restricting the operations of foreign law enforcement agents in 
 
12 Seelke, “Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020.” 
13 Arindrajit Dube, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar García-Ponce, “Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and 




Mexico, particularly the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The legislation 
mandates that all Mexican officials and law enforcement officers at all levels must report 
to the federal government any communication with foreign enforcement officers.14  
Through the new restrictions and protocols, the law paralyzes Mexico’s 
cooperation with international counterparts and places it in jeopardy.15 Additionally, it 
makes international enforcement officers report to institutions that they have deemed to 
be inherently corrupt or that could play a role in hindering potential operations. The 
relationship between the two countries is in a difficult standing as the domestic interests 
and protections that President López Obrador seeks to place can severely affect the long-
standing deals and initiatives that existed.  
Despite any positive result of the Mérida Initiative, its overall efficacy is in 
question as violence continues to escalate in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the 
United States rise.16 Through the initiatives planned in collaboration with the United 
States government, Mexico must establish a better-designed border security system to 
reduce the flow of weapons coming into the country. Unfortunately, because of the 
structural violence that exists and the adverse circumstances that many enforcers endure, 
bribing methods continue to come above following the law. Any efforts currently in place 
are overpowered by the idea of receiving and having more when joining efforts with the 
DTOs and as a response to the lack of appropriate compensation to security enforcers.  
 
14 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Dangerous Backtrack on the US-Mexico Security Relationship,” Brookings, 
accessed April 15, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/21/a-dangerous-
backtrack-on-the-us-mexico-security-relationship/. 
15 Ibid.  




WHAT DOES THE FUTURE OF MEXICO LOOK LIKE? 
 
Mexico, with the changes in political administrations, has attempted to reform 
itself to provide better opportunities and safety to its citizens. From the analysis 
conducted in Chapter 4, it can be concluded that the scholarship available about the 
embeddedness of violence as part of the structure of the system is a reality that still 
prevails. Most importantly, it is a reality that must be studied further to create more 
effective steps to alleviate some of the social issues the Mexican citizenry experiences. 
President Calderón came into his administration with extreme hope to combat organized 
crime and with a clear strategy, however, it failed to account for the approaches to 
violence that persist in the country and the weakness of institutions. The ordinary acts of 
violence have the power to cloud efforts to reduce violence in the streets. While President 
Peña Nieto began his administration with intentions to change policy to combat organized 
crime and provide further national internal security, the historical pattern of returning to 
old ways proved to be the easiest avenue during his time as government leader. Currently, 
under the López Obrador administration, there is still some optimism remaining from the 
hopeful voters during the last election. Nonetheless, the research today suggests that the 
governmental administrations have failed to provide safety nets to citizens and avenues 
for future well-being and security. While President López Obrador intends to reduce 
violence in the streets, the peace strategy might continue to fuel the illegitimacy of 
institutions and exacerbate the difficult realities of living in a Mexico that reached a 




CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURE 
 
The future of Mexico depends on addressing social and economic 
marginalization, combating organized crime, attending to the population of young people, 
implementing better approaches to drug violence, and improving the analysis of crime 
and violence.1 From conducting this analysis and research, it is simple to recognize some 
necessary steps that need to be taken concerning citizen development at the individual 
level to improve the livelihood of Mexico. There is an urgent need for more effective 
efforts to address the socio-economic roots of violence. It is vital to provide a decent 
education and employment opportunities so that young people have viable alternatives to 
crime and violence.2  
From the perspective of institutions, it is crucial to enhance citizen trust within 
communities and attempt to shift the reputation of police forces while simultaneously 
improving the judgment of justice to walk towards a possibility of strengthening the 
social fabric.3 According to Vilalta, the best tool in Mexico to deter the high rate of 
increase in deaths associated with the effects of organized crime would be the 
development of community programs and strategies to mutually empower individuals and 
their communities.4  
 
1 Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf.” 
2 Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, and Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico SPECIAL REPORT.” 
3 Beatriz Magaloni et al., “Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence 
in Mexico,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 4, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963836. 
4 Carlos Vilalta, “How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly? An Assessment of the Initial Conditions of the 
War Against Organized Crime in Mexico,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, accessed 





 In terms of collecting more accurate information and having proof of the impact 
of crime on citizenship, it is crucial to reinstall a culture of reporting. Since there has 
been a tremendous loss in the trust of institutions, the majority of crimes do not get 
reported. During 2017, when Tijuana was undergoing a significant experience with 
violence about 92.2% of crimes went unreported.5 Because law enforcement usually 
targets violence in the mainstream and more notable areas of the cities, where the wealthy 
individuals and commercial establishments reside, there seems to still be a disconnect 
from the marginalized areas of the country. There must be a more efficient strategy to 
target communities where there is a significant need and where the most vulnerable 
populations live to attempt to restructure their upbringings as intended by President 
López Obrador.6  
SHOULD IT BE LET GO? ACCEPTING VIOLENT PLURALISM 
 
It has been perceived that a key driver of peace in the nation has to do with a DTO 
emerging as a leader, as a result of pacts between criminal organizations, and from the 
establishment of implicit relationships with some government leaders. Under these 
arrangements, DTOs operate in a hierarchical system that allows each to benefit from 
their routes, to profit in their own way, and to continue to pursue their goals.7 When these 
pacts are settled, the majority source of violence comes from stemming low-level citizens 
that earn a living by tormenting the streets.  
The possibility of accepting violent pluralism can take us back to the argument 
 
5 Orozco Reynoso, “The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana.Pdf.” 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
 90 
 
provided by Elena Azaola where all other kinds of violence, specifically those seen as 
ordinary, leave strong footprints and bring out the harm that can be extremely profound 
and alter the course of life of many individuals.8 It limits and blocks their possibilities of 
development, while simultaneously affecting and impacting the collective life of the 
citizenship. These are the vibrant effects that can be noticeable in the displacement of 
individuals and the harm to their human rights and dignity.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, violent pluralism refers to the paradox of dynamic, 
democratic practices that enable and elect a political leadership that coexists with illicit 
actors trying to control territory with corrupt and coercive forms.9 Goldstein and Arias 
suggest that violent pluralism offers a way to think about violence, not just as indicative 
of democratic failure, but as a foundation of the democracy that Mexico currently lives 
under. This violence could be critical to the preservation of such democracy and an 
embedded reality of the political behavior of democratic citizens.  
Is the approach taken by President López Obrador the most effective way to 
preserve peace in the Mexican community? His vague Peace Plan has called for a variety 
of different efforts to appease the violence in the country, as his order demonstrated 
during the Battle of Culiacán. President López Obrador stated that his “adversaries can 
say that [he] showed weakness, but nothing is more important than people’s lives.”10 It is 
important to think about what leveling the playing field with criminal organizations will 
entail in the future of the country, perhaps, letting DTOs rule and bribe their way into the 
 
8 Azaola, “La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre.” 
9 Magaly Sanchez R, “Violent Democracies in Latin America Edited by Enrique Desmond Arias and 
Daniel M. Goldstein Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology, no. Princeton University (n.d.): 4. 
10 Graham, “Shootings in Northern Mexico Town Kill 20, Pile Pressure on President.” 
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system might be one of the ways to ensure that citizens’ dignity, rights, and stability are 
preserved. What would remain as concerning is the low-level individuals engaging in 
violent approaches because of the lack of opportunities and as a result of the feeling that 
this is the only way to survive, meaning that reversing and restructuring the structural 
inequality is crucial to the country. Similarly, realizing that ordinary violence is pervasive 
will provide better avenues to ensure that the root of the cause is targeted, starting at 
home. President López Obrador’s response can be interpreted as an illustration of the role 
that violence plays in preserving a particular form of democracy as suggested by violent 
pluralism.11 Violent pluralism illustrates what the relationship is between civil society, 
the violent actors, and now with the government leadership of the country.  
It is dangerous to conclude that democracy is only possible under conditions of 
violent pluralism, allowing the state to tolerate and integrate violence through a variety of 
violent actors.12 Nonetheless, with the current state of Mexico, it is important to consider 
approaches that will ensure citizens at least experience some sort of safety. Citizenship 
well-being and human rights need to be enhanced by developing growth opportunities, 
despite possible recurring violence around. Violent actions are the result of the 
entrenched and pervasive inequality that has been allowed to grow.  
FINAL REMARKS 
Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I found myself talking to friends 
and family about the inspiration and what drew me to pursue this venture. Deciding to 
 
11 Goldstein and Arias, Violent Democracies in Latin America. 




narrate the storyline of Mexico and its relationship with organized crime was something 
that I did not take lightly, but rather found common understanding in believing that this 
day was one that is ingrained in the minds of many Mexicans.  
The loss of trust in institutions has deeply affected the cohesiveness of the 
government and its relationship with the people. Since the case of the mass kidnapping in 
Iguala and the lack of answers, it is a fact that the citizenship felt betrayed, unheard, and 
failed by the government. While completely different circumstances, the Battle of 
Culiacán showcases the intensity and the impact of an altercation between the 
government and organized crime, a significant breaking point to the story of Mexico. In 
my perspective, it is a breaking point that does require immediate action and an extensive 
evaluation of the current structures of the country. It is a representation of the epitome of 
lost hope for most Mexican citizens who are tired of running for their lives, of hiding 
behind car wheels with hands to their ears and their eyes flinched, of squeezing their 
bodies underneath cars, and of trying to get away from the loud, non-stop sound of 
gunshots.13 
To this day, there are holes and gaps in this study that will hopefully continue to 
be filled despite the many limitations that exist due to the risks, obscurity, and difficulty 
in accessing accurate information. While we have approximations of how devastating and 
how extensive the impact of violence has been to the population, as we saw reflected, 
when the Mexican government conducts investigations, it runs into other upsetting 
realities such as finding more victims of the drug war. Field studies and surveys provide 
 
13 Johnson, “Revisiting the Battle of Culiacán.” 
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some sort of knowledge on how citizens feel about the leadership, how the war is being 
handled, and the negative repercussions the violence has, but fear still takes a toll on 
honesty and transparency. The structural violence that persists shadows the reflection of 
accurate information shared in the news and to scholarship.   
The field and study require tremendous courage for which I am truly grateful to 
the scholars mentioned throughout the writing and analysis. Many of the events 
connected to violence and organized crime are difficult to tie back to a specific 
phenomenon or take a much longer time to be dissected such as the 2014 Iguala Mass 
Kidnapping. It takes a long time to learn the truth of a damaging event to the Mexican 
community, if ever. The intentional hiding and confiscation of information have proven 
to be the most effective way for governments to attempt to avoid further repercussions 
and demands from citizenship.  
Many citizens continue to keep information due to fear of repercussions, threats, 
or because it is a waste of time because of the impunity. However, staying quiet can 
negatively impact the sociological and emotional well-being of citizens in the long run. 
The dignity and rights of Mexican citizens are hindered as a result of the lack of 
development opportunities, the failure of provision of safety and security, and of 
diminishing the recognition of their humanity. After remembering the Battle of Culiacán 
and seeing the faces of fear, it is more important than ever, to uplift and bring hope to 
citizens. Moving forward requires civilian strength and perseverance as recuperating 
from such disappointment can be difficult to achieve.  
The breaking point has provided a narrative of the realities that are entrenched 
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into the Mexican community. I am hopeful that this thesis provides a better understanding 
to those who are new to the story of Mexico, a foundation of knowledge to encourage 
each individual to find answers and reach their own conclusions, and inspire a new 
perspective to approach the violence in Mexico. The insight of the embeddedness of the 
various levels of violence allows the scholarship and the government to consider thinking 
beyond the usual approach to violence – combating drug violence – and instead focus on 
policy changes that emphasize providing safety and well-being that could start in nearby 
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